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1 Introduction
Supply, service and trading chains are a defining feature of the modern economy. They are
prominent in agriculture, in transport and communication networks, in international trade,
in markets for bribes and in finance. Goods and services pass through individuals or firms
located on these chains. The routing of economic activity, the earnings of individuals and the
efficiency of the system depend on the prices set by these different intermediaries. The aim
of this paper is to understand how the network structure of chains shapes market power and
thereby determines prices and efficiency.
To fix ideas, consider pricing in a transport network. A tourist wants to travel from
London to see the Louvre in Paris, using the Eurostar. The first leg of the journey is from
Home to St. Pancras Station. There are a number of different service such as taxi companies,
bus services and the Underground. Once at St. Pancras Station, the only service provider
to Paris Nord Station is Eurostar. Upon arriving at Paris Nord, there are a number of
alternatives (bus, Metro and taxi) to get to the Louvre. The network consists of alternative
paths each constituted of local transport alternatives in London and in Paris and a common
node (the Eurostar Company). Each of the service providers sets a price. The traveler picks
the cheapest ‘path’. Section 2 develops a number of other applications where pricing in
networks is important.
These examples motivate the following model. There is a source node, S, and a destination
node, D. A path between the two is a sequence of interconnected nodes, each occupied by
an intermediary. The source node and the destination node and all the paths between them
together define a network. The passage of goods from source to destination generates value.
Intermediaries simultaneously post a price to get a share of this value; the prices determine
a total cost for every path between S and D. We assume that the good moves along a least
cost path and an intermediary earns payoffs only if she is located on it. Posted prices are
the norm in transport and communication networks, and they are a good approximation in
environments where trade occurs at a high frequency, e.g., over-the-counter financial markets.
We study Nash equilibrium of the pricing game.
A node is said to be critical if it lies on all paths between S and D. Our main finding
is that criticality of nodes defines market power, and consequently pricing, earnings and the
efficiency of economic activity in networked markets. We now elaborate on the scope of this
finding, and locate it in the context of the literature.
In the benchmark model, intermediaries know the value. We prove existence and provide
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a complete characterization of Nash equilibrium (Theorem 1). For a given network, there
typically exist multiple equilibria: a. they range from efficient to inefficient (where trade
breaks down completely), and b. in every efficient equilibrium all the surplus goes either to S
and D or all of it goes to the intermediaries. The presence of critical traders is sufficient but
not necessary for intermediation rents; non-critical intermediaries may extract rents because
intermediaries in competing paths mis-coordinate and price themselves out of contention.
In the presence of critical traders, there exist equilibria in which the entire surplus accrues
to these traders, but there also exist equilibria in which it is captured by the non-critical
intermediaries. Standard equilibrium refinements do not help us in this situation: either they
are too demanding and we face non-existence problems, or they are insufficiently restrictive.
To gain a deeper understanding of the relation between networks and market power, we
take the model to the laboratory. Our experiments highlight the ability of human subjects to
coordinate on efficient outcomes. They show that critical traders set high prices and extract
most of the surplus. Thus our theoretical work and experiments taken together establish
that the presence of critical intermediaries is both necessary and sufficient for large surplus
extraction by intermediaries and that most of the surplus does accrue to critical traders.
In markets with multiple vertically related firms, double marginalization is a major concern
for policy and regulation; see e.g., Lerner (1934), Tirole (1993) and Spulber (1999).1 In our
benchmark model, the number of intermediaries per se has no impact on the efficiency of trade.
This is because the value is perfectly known to all intermediaries. We extend our benchmark
model to a setting where value is uncertain. We prove existence and provide a complete
characterization of equilibrium in this model (Theorem 2). As in the benchmark model, there
typically exist multiple equilibria. However, the new model also exhibits important differences.
Intermediaries who set positive prices and lie on a least cost path all set the same price; this
price and the efficiency of trade are falling in the number of intermediaries. The multiplicity
of equilibrium motivates an experimental investigation. Our experiments highlight the impact
of length of trading chains, especially the number of critical intermediaries, on prices and the
efficiency of trade.
Our model offers a generalization of the classical models of price competition (a la Bertrand)
and the Nash demand game (Nash, 1950), to a setting with multiple price setting agents where
both coordination, competition and double marginalization are important. In the theoreti-
1Double marginalization figured prominently in the Microsoft anti-trust case in the United States: it was
used as an argument against splitting Microsoft into two firms one specializing in operating systems and the
other specializing in software development (Economides (2001).
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cal literature, there has been considerable recent interest in the study of intermediation in
networks. There are broadly three protocols for ‘price’ formation: auctions (Kotowski and
Leister (2012)), bargaining (Condorelli and Galeotti (2011), Gofman (2011), Manea (2013))
and posted prices (Acemoglu and Ozdagler (2007a, 2007b), Blume et al. (2007) and Gale and
Kariv (2009)). As we study a model with posted prices, our paper falls in the third strand
of work.2 There are three main difference between our paper and these papers: one, the gen-
erality of our network framework (that encompasses all networks and allows for incomplete
information), two, our complete characterization of equilibrium and three, the methodological
combination of theory and experiments. To the best of our knowledge, the result on role of
node criticality in shaping pricing and division of surplus is novel.3
In production supply chains and in transportation and communication networks a firm or a
consumer will choose the cheapest path. In agriculture supply chains and financial brokerage
chains the current owner of an object sells to the highest bidder downstream; he/she will
typically not have any interest in the cost of the entire path. Appendix II relates our model
of simultaneous posted price to the sequential auction model in Kotowski and Leister (2012)
and to the simultaneous Bid-Ask model in Gale and Kariv (2009). There we show how our
equilibrium characterization result with posted prices and cheapest cost routing (Theorem 1)
is informative – and broadly similar – to the outcome generated in these trading protocols.
We contribute to the economic study of networks. The research on networks has been
concerned with the formation, structure and functioning of social and economic networks;
for book length surveys, see Goyal (2007), Jackson (2008), and Vega-Redondo(2007). The
problem of ‘key players’ has traditionally been studied in terms of maximal independent
sets, Bonacich centrality, eigenvector and degree centrality, see e.g., Ballester et al. (2006),
Bramoulle and Kranton (2007), De Marzo et al. (2003), Elliot and Golub (2013), Galeotti et
al. (2010), Golub and Jackson (2010). The contribution of our paper is to show that criticality
of nodes, which is very different from “classical” measures of centrality, offers an appropriate
2For an early paper on the relation between price and quantity competition see Sonnenschein (1968).
For models of networks where traders choose quantities see Babus and Kondor (2013), Malamud and Rostek
(2013) and Nava (2010). Our paper also broadly relates to Ostrovsky (2008) that extends the study of pairwise
stability developed in the matching literature to more general environments of trade as such supply chains.
However,, our focus on how the structure of supply chains affect market power is very different from the
questions studies in Ostrovsky (2008).
3Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2007a, 2007b) consider parallel paths between the source and destination pair.
This rules out the existence of ‘critical’ traders. Blume et al. (2007) consider a setting with only a single
layer of intermediation; this rules out coordination problems and the interaction between coordination and
the market power of intermediaries. Finally, Gale and Kariv (2009) study multiple layers of intermediaries
and full connectivity across adjacent layers; this rules out ‘critical’ traders.
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measure of market power.4
Our paper also contributes to the large body of experimental work on bargaining and
trading in markets. Our finding on efficiency in the benchmark model echoes a recurring
theme in economics, first pointed out in the pioneering work of Smith (1962), and more
recently highlighted in the work of Gale and Kariv (2009). The special case of one critical
intermediary can be interpreted as a dictator game; our results on full extraction of surplus
stand in contrast to the general message from the research on dictator games; see Engel (2011).
The case of two critical intermediaries may be viewed as a symmetric Nash demand game.
Our experiments reveal a high frequency of trade and equal division of surplus; these results
are consistent with existing literature, e.g., Roth and Murnighan (1982), Roth (1995), and
Fischer et al. (2006). Efficiency and surplus division has been studied with bargaining in
two-sided networked markets by Charness et al. (2007). To the best of our knowledge our
paper is the first experimental study of chains of intermediation in networks.5 The treatments
involving a combination of critical and non-critical intermediaries are novel relative to the
literature. These treatments provide us a first glimpse into the interaction between market
power and competition in supply chains and related environments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the model and
discuss how a number of important questions in applications can be studied within our frame-
work. Section 3 analyzes the benchmark model where value is common knowledge, while
Section 4 takes up the model with unknown value. Section 5 discusses potential sources of
anomalous pricing behavior in the experiments. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are presented
in Appendix I. Supplementary material is presented in Appendices II-IV. The paper also uses
Online Appendices for sample instructions of experiments and further data analysis.6
2 The model
There is a source node, S, and a destination node, D. A path q between S and D, is a
sequence of distinct nodes {i1, ..., il} such that gSi1 = gi1i2 = ... = gilD = 1. The set of paths
4This is easily seen in a network with a single chain – say with 4 intermediaries – between the S and D.
Standard measures of centrality assign greater centrality to the two middle nodes, while all nodes are critical.
Our theory and experiments suggest that all the four intermediaries set the same price.
5There is a large sociological literature on exchange. We share with this literature the motivation of how
power may emerge in networks, but we are also interested in questions of efficiency and our formulation in
terms of posted prices and our results are quite different. We refer to Easley and Keinberg (2010) for a survey
of this work.
6http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/˜uctpsc0/Research/CGG I OnlineAppendices.pdf
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is denoted by Q. Every node i is called an intermediary ; let N = {1, 2, 3..., n}, n ≥ 1, denote
the set of intermediaries. The nodes N ∪ {S,D} and the paths Q define a network, g.
Every intermediary i simultaneously posts a price pi ≥ 0. Let p = {p1, p2, ..., pn} denote
the price profile. The network g and the price profile p define a cost for every path q between
S and D:
c(q, p) =
∑
i∈q
pi. (1)
Payoffs arise out of active intermediation: an intermediary i obtains pi only if he lies on a
feasible least cost path. A least cost path q′ is one such that c(q′, p) = minq∈Q c(q, p). Define
c(p) = minq∈Q c(q, p). A path q is feasible if c(q, p) ≤ v, where v is the value of economic
‘good’ generated by the path. All paths generate the same value v. If there are multiple least
cost paths, one of them is chosen randomly to be the active path. We assume that v is known
and it is normalized to be equal to v = 1. Section 4 studies the case where intermediaries
have incomplete information about v.
Given g and p, let Q∗ = {q ∈ Q : c(q, p) = c(p), c(p) ≤ 1} be the set of feasible least cost
paths. Given network g and price profile p, the payoff to intermediary i ∈ N is:
Πi(p) =
{
0 if i 6∈ q, ∀ q ∈ Q∗
η∗i
|Q∗|pi if i ∈ q, q ∈ Q∗,
(2)
where η∗i is the number of paths in Q∗ that contain intermediary i.
We study (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium of the posted price game. A price profile p∗ is
a Nash equilibrium if for all i ∈ N , Πi(p∗) ≥ Πi(pi, p∗−i) for all pi ≥ 0. An equilibrium p∗ is
efficient if c(p∗) ≤ 1. Otherwise, the equilibrium is inefficient.7
In principle, nodes that lie on many paths have more opportunities to act as an inter-
mediary. The betweenness centrality of a node i ∈ N is the fraction of paths on which
intermediary i lies.8 Let ηi = |{q ∈ Q|i ∈ q}| and define betweenness centrality of interme-
diary i as ci = ηi/|Q|, where ci ∈ [0, 1]. Intermediary i is said to be critical if ci = 1. Let
C = {i ∈ N : ci = 1} be the set of critical intermediaries. Observe that criticality is a property
of the network per se, and is independent of the price profile. For simplicity, we suppress the
7We have assumed that only intermediaries set prices: the source and destination are price takers. We can
easily accommodate price setting by source-destination; in that case our characterization result, Theorem 1,
applies to the surplus net of the prices that the source-destination pair set.
8We consider all paths and not just the shortest paths; in this, we follow Borgatti and Everett (2005).
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dependence of C on g.
The model offers a general framework to study the relation between networks and pricing
behavior of traders. We now discuss a number of applications to illustrate the scope of the
model.
2.1 Applications
1. Transportation and communication Networks: The example we sketched in the
introduction falls under the large umbrella of transportation and communication networks
(that include air lines, shipping, Internet, cable TV). Traditionally, these sectors have been
heavily regulated or were under public sector control. The large scale privatization in the UK
in the early 1980’s was a precursor for a global trend. Now it is common for a consumer to
make a choice among alternative bundles of services provided by a number of distinct service
providers. A key policy concern is the nature of market power in these networks.9
2. Supply chains: Consider a Sony Vaio Laptop. It usually has an Intel processor, the
hard drive is from Seagate Technology, Hitachi, Fujitsu or Toshiba, the RAM is from Infineon
or Elpida, the wireless chipset is from Atheros or Intel, the optical drive is from Hitachi or
Matsushita, the graphics card is from Intel, NVIDIA or AMD. The speakers may be from HP
or is from Sony. The different intermediate input suppliers set prices; Sony picks the best
combination of inputs and prices.
Anderson and Wincoop (2004) show that trade intermediation costs amount to a significant
tax on international transactions. Hummels et al. (2001) showed that production supply
chains increasingly traverse the world and decisively shape the pattern and volume of trade.
Antras and Costinot (2011) is a recent attempt at understanding international trade with
intermediaries,, while Antras and Chor (2013) study the optimal organisation of a supply
chain. The empirical significance of supply chains motivates a systematic study of strategic
pricing in general networks.
3. Corruption: The bribing of public officials for access to goods and services and for the
granting of licenses and permits is a prominent feature of economic life in many countries.
Shleifer and Vishney (1993) and Ades and Di Tella (1999) have argued that the level of bribes
should be viewed as a function of the ‘market power’ of officials. In some contexts there is a
single line of officials (or committees) who must approve a decision, while in others there may
9Firms in communication and transportation networks use a rich set of price strategies; discrimination with
regard to source and destination is common.
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exist multiple competing chains of decision makers (as on highway tolls, Olken and Barron
(2009)). These examples motivate an enquiry into the ways the network of decision making
shapes the power of officials in the market for bribes.
4. Intermediation in agriculture: Consider coffee. At the start, there is a farmer in a
developing country who typically works on a small farm. The farmer chooses from among
a few intermediaries who process his coffee cherries to obtain beans. These intermediaries
sell the beans onward to one of the small number of exporting trading firms. The exporters
sell to dealers/brokers, who in turn sell to roasters (like Nestle). Nestle then sells to large
supermarkets and local stores. Finally, consumers buy the coffee from a retailer.
Such long chains of intermediation are common across the agricultural sector, e.g., Fafchamps
and Minten (1999). Historically, the market power of intermediaries has been a major concern
and has led to large scale state intervention in this sector. But by the 1990’s, it was felt that
state agencies discouraged innovation and the entry of new intermediaries, leading to a very
inefficient system (see e.g., Bayley, (2002), Meerman (1997)). Recent decades have witnessed
a large scale liberalization of the intermediation sector. The effects of liberalization have,
however, been mixed; for a discussion, see Trauba and Jayne (2008). This research motivates
a theoretical study of the determinants of pricing and division of surplus in intermediation
networks.
5. Financial Intermediation: Consider the market for municipal bonds in the United
States. This is the largest capital market for state and municipal issuers. It has market
capitalization of over $4 trillion, with daily trading volumes of around $ 10-20 billion. Li and
Schu¨rhoff (2012) show that trading of these bonds is organized as a decentralized over the
counter (OTC) broker-dealer market. The network of traders has a core-periphery structure,
with roughly 20-30 dealer firms at the core and several hundred peripheral dealer firms (there
are around 700 firms trading in municipal bonds in any given month). Bonds move from the
municipality through an average of 6 inter-dealer trades. There is systematic price dispersion
across dealers, with dealers in the core maintaining systematically larger margins. These
empirical patterns motivate a theoretical study of how the network shapes pricing margins
and the profitability.
In Examples 1, 2 and 3, a consumer or a firm will choose the path: it is reasonable to
suppose that the cheapest path will be picked. In Examples 4 and 5, on the other hand, the
agent who owns an object will sell it to the highest bidder downstream and does not have any
interest in the cost of the entire path.
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This motivates the following Bid-Ask price variant of our model.10 Following Gale and
Kariv (2009), suppose that every intermediary i ∈ N simultaneously sets a bid and ask (bi, ai).
The source S accepts the highest bid, and the destination D buys as long as the lowest ask
price is not greater than v. The object passes from intermediary i to a connected intermediary
j with the highest bid bj, subject to the condition that bj ≥ ai. We study this alternative
model of pricing in Appendix II. The analysis there establishes that every equilibrium outcome
in our model is also an equilibrium outcome of the Bid-Ask model; the converse is not true
in general. However, for some important classes of networks – that include trees and multi-
partite networks – the equilibrium outcomes in the two models are equivalent. So, for these
networks, our equilibrium characterization result in the benchmark model, Theorem 1, also
holds for the Bid-Ask model.
3 Networks, market power and efficiency
We prove existence and provide a complete characterization of Nash equilibrium. For any
given network, there typically exist multiple equilibria, with widely varying pricing, efficiency
and division of surplus. We then take the model to the laboratory. The experiments highlight
two points: one, the ability of human subjects to coordinate on efficient outcomes, and two,
the role of node criticality as an organizing principle for understanding market power.
We say that trader i is essential under p if he belongs to every feasible least cost path.
Given price profile p, for path q, let c−j(q, p) =
∑
i∈q,i6=j pi, be the total cost of all intermediaries
other than j.11
Theorem 1
A. Existence: In every network there exists an efficient equilibrium.
B. Characterization: An equilibrium p∗ is either inefficient (c(p∗) > 1), intermediaries
extract all the surplus (c(p∗) = 1), or they earn nothing (c(p∗) = 0). Moreover,
10This model assumes that dealers commit to a certain bid-ask. This is a good approximation for assets
where trading occurs at a high frequency and over-the-counter. In these markets, the pricing strategy of a
particular dealer-firm is generally decided before trade starts, and then implemented by the different traders.
11It is worth noting the distinction between essential and critical nodes. Criticality is a property of the
network per se, while essentiality is defined by the network and the price profile together. So a node may be
essential even if there are no critical nodes in the network: this point is taken up in the discussion on multiple
equilibria below.
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1. c(p∗) = 0 is an equilibrium if, and only if, no trader is essential.
2. c(p∗) = 1 is an equilibrium if, and only if, (i) every trader i ∈ q, q ∈ Q∗ who
sets p∗i > 0 is essential, and (ii) for every trader i /∈ q, ∀q ∈ Q∗, if i ∈ q′ then
c−i(q′∗) ≥ 1.
3. c(p∗) > 1 is an equilibrium, if, and only if, c−i(q, p∗) ≥ 1, ∀ i ∈ q, ∀q ∈ Q.
The argument for the existence of efficient equilibrium is constructive. First, consider a
network with no critical traders. The 0 price profile is a Nash equilibrium, as no intermediary
can earn positive profits by deviating and setting a positive price. If an intermediary sets
a positive price S and D will circumvent him, as there exists a zero cost path without him.
Next consider a network with critical traders. It may be checked that a price profile in which
critical traders set positive prices that add up to 1 and all non-critical traders set 0 price is
an equilibrium.
The characterization yields a number of insights. The first observation is that in every
efficient equilibrium intermediation costs take on extreme values. The intuition is as follows:
if the feasible least cost path is unique, then intermediaries in that path exercise market power
and so, if intermediation costs are below the value of exchange, an intermediary in that path
could slightly increase his intermediation price while guaranteeing that exchange takes place
through him. In contrast, when there are multiple feasible least cost paths, there is price
competition among intermediaries on different paths. In this case, whenever intermediation
costs are larger than zero, an intermediary demanding a positive price gains by undercutting
his price. Price competition drives down intermediation costs to zero.
The second observation is on how critical traders have market power. Observe that a
critical trader is essential. Hence, the presence of critical traders is sufficient to ensure that
intermediaries extract all surplus in every efficient equilibrium.
Criticality dictates that all surplus must accrue to intermediaries, but the theory is permis-
sive about how it is distributed among them. To see this point, consider the Ring with Hubs
and Spokes network presented in Figure 1 and suppose that S and D are located on (a1, d1).
Then there exists an equilibrium in which all surplus accrues to the critical intermediaries,
e.g., A and D charge 1/2 and all other intermediaries charge 0, but there is also an equilibrium
in which the entire surplus is earned by non-critical intermediaries, e.g., A and D charge 0, B
and C charge 1/2, and F and E charge 1.
The final observation is about the multiplicity of equilibria. Consider the ring network
with 6 traders presented in Figure 1 and suppose that S is located at A and D is located at D.
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The three equilibria described by Theorem 1 are possible in this network: all intermediaries
set price 0, all of them set price 1, and intermediaries B and C set price 1 while intermediaries
set price E and F set price 1/2 each. In the last case note that E and F are essential but they
are not critical. Thus criticality is not necessary for surplus extraction by intermediaries.
This multiplicity motivates an exploration of equilibrium refinements. We consider a num-
ber of possible refinements – trembling hand perfection, strictness, strong Nash equilibrium,
elimination of weakly dominated strategies, and perturbed Nash demand games. We find
that in some cases these refinements are too strong, e.g., there do not exist strict or strong
Nash equilibrium in some networks. In other cases, the refinement is not effective, e.g., a
wide range of outcomes (including those with coordination failure) may be sustained under
trembling hand perfection, elimination of weakly dominated strategies, and perturbed bar-
gaining.12 To gain a deeper understanding of the relation between networks, competition,
market power and efficiency, we therefore conduct an experimental investigation of posted
prices in networks.
3.1 Posted prices in the Laboratory
3.1.1 Experimental Design
We have chosen networks that allow us to examine the role of coordination, competition and
market power. These networks are depicted in Figure 1.
The ring networks with 4, 6 and 10 traders allow us to focus on coordination and competi-
tion.13 For every choice of S and D, there are always two competing paths of intermediaries.
In Ring 4, for any non-adjacent pair, there are two paths with a single intermediary each.
Ring 6 and Ring 10 allow for situations with a higher (and possibly unequal) number of
intermediaries on either path.
The Ring with Hubs and Spokes network allows for a study of the impact of market power:
for instance, if S is located at a1 and D is located at a2, intermediary A is a pure monopoly,
while if D is b1, then the intermediaries A and B play a symmetric Nash demand game. This
network also creates the space for both market power and competition to come into play. For
12Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007) considered a cooperative solution concept – the kernel – in their work.
They showed that non-critical traders would earn 0 and critical traders would split the cake equally in allo-
cations in the kernel. Our analysis above reveals that this solution is a Nash equilibrium of the pricing game
but that there exist a variety of other equilibria.
13We have also run experiments on a ring network with 8 traders. The results are in line with the one
presented in this section and they are not presented to simplify exposition.
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Figure 1: Networks in the benchmark design
instance, if S is located at a1 and D is located at e1, then there are two competing paths: a
shorter path (through A, F , and E) and a longer path (through A, B, C, D, and E). Traders
A and E are the only critical intermediaries.
To put these experimental variations in perspective, we summarize the equilibrium analysis
for the selected networks. In Ring 4 there is a unique equilibrium that corresponds to the
Bertrand outcome. In every other network, whenever there are at least two intermediaries on
every path, there exist both efficient and inefficient equilibria. This observation motivates our
first question:
Question 1: How does the efficiency of trade vary with ring size and the presence of critical
traders?
If trading does take place, Theorem 1 predicts an extremal division of trade surplus: either
intermediaries earn 0 surplus or they extract all trade surplus. In the Ring 4, intermediation
cost is 0 in the unique equilibrium; but in all other Rings, both extremal outcomes are possible
in equilibrium. In the Ring with Hubs and Spokes, whenever exchange involves critical traders,
equilibrium dictates full surplus extraction by intermediaries. These considerations motivate
the second question:
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Session
Treatment 1 2 Total
Ring 4 16 / 240 16 / 240 32 / 480
Ring 6 18 / 180 24 / 240 42 / 420
Ring 10 20 / 120 20 / 120 40 / 240
Ring w. hubs/spokes 18 / 180 24 / 240 42 / 420
Table 1: Treatments in Benchmark Model
Question 2: Is the division of surplus extremal? How does it vary with the presence of critical
traders?
Finally, we turn to the situation in the Ring with Hubs and Spokes where all three forces
of interest – coordination, competing paths and critical traders – are present. Theorem 1
tells us that all surplus must accrue to intermediaries, but it is silent on how the surplus is
distributed among the intermediaries. This observation motivates our third question:
Question 3: What is the division of surplus between critical and non-critical intermediaries?
3.1.2 Experimental procedures
We ran the experiments at the Experimental Laboratory of the Centre for Economic Learning
and Social Evolution (ELSE) at University College London (UCL) between June and De-
cember 2012. The subjects in the experiment were recruited from the ELSE pool of human
subjects consisting UCL undergraduate and master students across all disciplines. Each sub-
ject participated in only one of the experimental sessions. After subjects read the instructions,
an experimental administrator read the instructions aloud. Each experimental session lasted
around two hours. The experiment was computerized and conducted using the experimental
software z-Tree developed by Fischbacher (2007). Sample instructions are reported in the
Online Appendix. Each session uses one network treatment. We ran 2 sessions for each treat-
ment. Each session consisted of 60 independent rounds. Table 1 provides an overview of the
experimental design. In each cell we report number of subjects/number of group observations.
We employ random matching with random assignment of network positions across rounds.
In each round of a treatment subjects are assigned with equal probability to one of the possible
positions of a network. In Ring n, all nodes are possible positions. In Ring with Hubs and
Spokes, each spoke node is a computer-generated agent, and the remaining nodes are all
feasible positions for the human subjects. Groups with one subject per intermediary position
are then randomly formed. The position of a subject and the groups formed in each round
depend solely upon chance and is independent of the subject’s position and the groups formed
in previous rounds, respectively.
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We deliberately choose the protocol of random matching with random assignment. This
procedure anonymizes the identity of subjects throughout a session, and thereby helps avoid
”repeated games” effects that arise if the same fixed group of subjects play a game repeatedly.
The advantage of using subjects repeatedly under this protocol is that it allows us to collect
a large amount of data from a given number of subjects, while they have an opportunity of
learning how to play a game. Other protocols, in which subjects never meet again someone
who they have played before, require large subject pools or provide fewer observations with less
opportunity of subjects’ learning. There is good evidence supporting the notion that random
matching protocol is an effective way of minimizing repeated games effects (e.g., Duffy and
Ochs (2009)). Irrespective of concerns of potential repeated games effects, our experiments
present clean evidence of network treatment effects because we keep the random matching
and assignment protocol constant.
For each group, a pair of two non-adjacent nodes is randomly selected as S and D. Each
pair of two non-adjacent nodes is equally likely to be selected. All subjects in each group
are informed of the position of S and D in the network. All traders are informed that the
surplus/value of exchange is 100 tokens. Then, all human subjects in an intermediary role are
asked to submit an intermediation price: a real number (up to two decimal places) between 0
and 100. The computer calculates the intermediation costs across different paths. Exchange
takes place if the least cost among all paths is less than or equal to 100. If there are multiple
feasible least cost paths then one of them is picked at random.
At the end of the round, subjects observe all posted prices in their group, the trading
outcome, and the earnings of all subjects. We assume that S and D are each allocated one
half of the net surplus, i.e., one half of 100 minus the intermediation costs. Then the subjects
move to the next round.
In each round, earnings are calculated in terms of tokens. For each subject, the earnings
in the experiment are the sum of his or her earnings over 60 rounds. At the end of the
experiment, subjects are informed of their earnings in tokens. The tokens are exchanged in
British pounds with 60 tokens being set equal to £1. Subjects received their earnings plus £5
show-up fee privately, at the end of the experiment.
3.1.3 Findings
We start by examining the efficiency of trade in networks. Table 2 reports the relative fre-
quency of trade across different treatments.
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All ( ≥ 2) 2 3 4 5
1.00 1.00 -- -- --
(480) (480)
1.00 1.00 1.00 -- --
(420) (289) (131)
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(240) (49) (87) (69) (35)
0.95 1.00 0.94 0.90 0.90
(420) (126) (155) (109) (30)
Ring 10
Ring with Hubs
and Spokes
Note. The number of group observations is reported in parentheses.
Network
minimum distance of buyer-sell pair
Ring 4
Ring 6
Table 2: Frequency of Trading
Trade occurs with probability 1 in ring networks, regardless of their size and of the distance
between S and D. In Ring with Hubs and Spokes the frequency of trade is around 0.95. So,
market power does not have any significant effect on efficiency of trading. Overall, despite the
need for coordination among intermediaries along the same path, the presence of competition
between paths and the presence of market power of some intermediaries, traders across all
treatments are very successful in coordinating on prices that ensure exchange.
Finding 1: The level of efficiency is remarkably high in all networks. Trading in Rings with
4, 6, and 10 intermediaries occurs with probability 1. In the Ring with Hubs and Spokes,
trading occurs with probability around 0.95.
In Rings we distinguish trading situations with respect to distances of the two competing
paths between S and D, denoted by (d (q) , d (q′)). In Ring with Hubs and Spokes we distin-
guish trading situations with respect to (i) the number of critical intermediaries (#Cr), (ii) the
number of intermediation paths (#Paths), and (iii) the distance of each path (d (q) , d (q′)).
Figure 2 presents average intermediation costs, conditional on trading, based on the last 20
rounds, with 95% confidence interval across different trading situations.
In the Online Appendix we report the movement across rounds in average intermediation
costs across distinct trading situations in Rings and Ring with Hubs and Spokes (see Table
12). Whenever there are no critical traders (resp. there are only critical traders) there is a
clear downward trend (resp. upward trend) in the movement of intermediation costs across
rounds. When there are both critical and non-critical traders, intermediation costs are stable
over time.
In Ring 4, intermediation costs are around 5 percent of the surplus. In the other rings,
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Figure 2: Costs of intermediation
intermediation costs vary between 10 and 20 percent of the surplus. The overall conclusion
is that intermediation costs in all ring networks are modest and, between the two efficient
equilibria, are much closer to the one with zero intermediation cost, especially in the smaller
rings.
In the Ring with Hubs and Spokes, when S and D are served by a sole critical intermediary,
the situation is analogous to the dictator game, widely studied in the experimental literature
(for a survey, see Engel (2011)). We found a surplus extraction of 99%, which is much higher
than the one reported in the experimental literature. This suggests that traders located at
critical nodes in a network interpret their location as a form of ‘earned endowment’ in the
sense of Cherry et al. (2002). This may give rise to a sense of entitlement that is distinct
from the standard dictator game.14
When S and D are connecting via one single path with two intermediaries, the game
played by the two intermediaries is analogous to a symmetric Nash demand game. We find
that intermediaries extract, in total, around 96% of the surplus, and they share it roughly
equally.15. These findings are consistent with the findings in the experimental literature of
Nash bargaining (e.g., Roth and Murnighan (1982) and Fischer et al (2006)).
Finally, when there are two competing paths and critical traders, intermediation cost
14We also note that in our design, in some situations, both S and D are computer generated agents, while
in others one of them is a human subject. We found no behavioral difference across these cases. This leads us
to believe that the human subject vs. computer issue does not play a major role in explaining the behavior of
subjects in our experiment.
15see Table 13 in the Online Appendix
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1 ~ 20 21 ~ 41 41 ~ 60
0.56 0.68 0.72
(20) (26) (25)
0.48 0.56 0.67
(16) (13) (10)
0.73 0.77 0.80
(16) (19) (24)
0.65 0.67 0.74
(8) (8) (11)
Notes. The number in a cell is the average fraction of costs charged by critical traders. The
number of observations is reported in parentheses. #Cr denotes the number of critical
intermediaries, #Paths denotes the number of paths connecting buyer and seller, d(q) denotes
the length of path q beween buyer and seller.
Network (#Cr,#Paths, d(q),d(q'))
Rounds
Ring with
Hubs and
Spokes
(1, 2, 3, 5)
(1, 2, 4, 4)
(2, 2, 4, 6)
(2, 2, 5, 5)
Table 3: Surplus division among intermediaries
ranges between 62% and 83%. In the case without critical intermediaries, this cost falls
sharply to around 28%, which is comparable to the low-cost outcome found in Rings. We
summarize this discussion in our second finding.
Finding 2: The presence of critical traders is both necessary and sufficient for large surplus
extraction by intermediaries. In Rings with 4,6, and 10 traders, intermediation costs are
small (ranging from 5% to 20%). In the Ring with Hubs and Spokes, with critical traders,
intermediation costs are large (60% to over 95%).
We now turn to the issue of how surplus is divided between critical and non-critical in-
termediaries. Table 3 presents the average fraction of intermediation costs charged by critical
traders, conditional on exchange (here data is grouped into the blocks of 20 rounds, due to
small samples). The number within parentheses is the number of group observations. Look-
ing at the last 20 rounds, we observe that 67% to 80% of intermediation costs go to critical
trader(s). In all the cases, regardless of whether an exchange takes place along the shorter or
longer path, the number of non-critical traders is at least as large as the number of critical
traders. To summarize:
Finding 3: In the Ring with Hubs and Spokes, critical intermediaries set higher prices and
earn a much higher share of surplus as compared to non-critical intermediaries.
We have established that network structure – reflected in the criticality of nodes – has
powerful effects on intermediation costs and the division of surplus. To gain a deeper under-
standing of the mechanisms of competition and market power, we now examine the pricing
behavior of traders directly.
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Figure 3: Competition among intermediaries
We focus on the last 20 rounds and Figure 3 depicts average prices.16 In the Ring with
6 and 10 traders, there is a tight competition between paths. Intermediaries on a longer
path chose, on average, prices somewhere between 5 and 10, independently of the distances of
the two paths across all ring networks. Responding strategically to this, intermediaries on a
shorter path chose higher prices that are proportionate to the difference in distance between
two paths. As a result, even when the two paths are very asymmetric, they have very similar
intermediation costs and trade occurs frequently – roughly one third of the time –along the
longer path! Table 4 provides data on these patterns.
In the Ring with Hubs and Spokes, the pricing of critical and non-critical intermediaries is
very different. Critical intermediaries post much higher prices than non-critical intermediaries.
The non-critical intermediaries post prices that are similar to intermediaries in Rings. For
instance, when there is one critical intermediary and the two competing paths are of distance
3 and 5, the critical intermediary charges, on average, a price close to 50, the only non-critical
intermediary lying in the shorter path charges a price close to 24 and the three non-critical
intermediaries in the longer path post a price around 8. Similar behavior is observed in the
other cases. This demonstrates the strong impact of network criticality on pricing behavior
and the division of surplus.
To further check the sharp differences in pricing behavior among different types of interme-
16In the Online Appendix, Table 13 reports average prices charged across rounds by intermediaries in Rings
and Ring with Hubs and Spokes, respectively.
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Ring 4 (2, 2) 3.99 --
(2, 4) 4.45 0.65
(3, 3) 4.01 --
(2, 8) 15.20 0.64
(3, 7) 5.30 0.68
(4, 6) 6.82 0.68
(5, 5) 5.01 --
Freq. on a shorter path|cost1 - cost2|
Ring 6
Ring 10
Notes. We report the sample median of absolute differences of two
competing paths, using the sample of last 20 rounds. The number in the last
column is the frequency of trading on a shorter path.
Network (d(q), d(q'))
Table 4: Short versus long paths
Ring 6
Dependent variable: price (2, 4) (2, 8) (3, 7) (4, 6) (3,5) (4,4) (4,6) (5,5)
(1) Non-critical & on a shorter path 9.478 22.234 6.316 2.351 18.571 11.464
(1.123)*** (5.421)*** (0.677)*** (0.394)*** (2.807)*** (1.468)***
(2) Critical 40.173 27.554 27.923 14.338
(2.920)*** (4.340)*** (1.731)*** (1.626)***
Constant 5.380 2.250 3.524 4.454 9.085 13.333 8.028 5.662
(0.415)*** (0.139)*** (0.454)*** (0.237)*** (3.537)** (1.852)*** (1.298)*** (1.626)***
H 0 : (1) = (2) or H 0 : (2) = 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(p -value)
R-squared 0.313 0.464 0.336 0.330 0.728 0.771 0.776 0.840
Number of obs. 376 112 224 200 134 50 156 66
Ring 10 Ring with Hubs and Spokes
#Cr = 1 #Cr = 2
Notes: Each regression controls for individual heterogeneity by including dummies for individual subjects. Robust standard errors, are reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level.
Table 5: Regression of pricing on network position
diaries presented in Figure 3, Table 5 presents the results of regressions of prices on dummies
for critical trader and non-critical trader on a shorter path. Data are from the last 20 rounds
and we control for individual heterogeneity by including individual subject dummies. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. In Ring networks, traders on a shorter path chose
significantly higher prices than those on a longer path. In the Ring with Hubs and Spokes,
critical intermediaries chose significantly higher prices than non-critical intermediaries. The
price difference between non-critical intermediaries on short and long path is statistically
significant.
Finally, while intermediation costs do take on extreme values, they depart significantly
from the theoretical predictions. In Section 5 we show that the observed departures from
equilibrium pricing and surplus extraction are consistent with a model of noisy best response
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with risk aversion.
4 Uncertain demand, competition and market power
In our benchmark model, the number of intermediaries per se has no impact on the efficiency
of trade. This is because the value of surplus is perfectly known to all intermediaries. We
now extend the benchmark model to allow for uncertain demand. We prove existence and
provide a complete characterization of equilibrium in this model. As in the benchmark model,
there typically exist multiple equilibria, with very different pricing, efficiency and division of
surplus. However, the analysis also reveals important differences with the benchmark model:
active intermediaries are predicted to all set the same price and the number of intermediaries
has powerful effects on pricing and the efficiency of trade. Our experiments highlight the
interplay between these theoretical predictions and the role of node criticality.
We now assume that the surplus v is unknown; it has a distribution F (.) on the interval
[0, 1], with a continuously differentiable density f(.). Given g and p, define Qv to be the set
of feasible least cost paths, for a realized value v. Given network g and price profile p, the
payoff to an intermediary i, for every realized value v, is
pii(p, v) =
{
0 if i 6∈ q ∀ q ∈ Qv
ηvi
|Qv |pi if i ∈ q for q ∈ Qv,
where ηvi is the number of paths in Qv that contain intermediary i. Finally, given network
g and price profile p, the expected payoff to intermediary i is:
Πi(p) = Ev[pii(p, v)]. (3)
An equilibrium is efficient (resp. inefficient) if trade occurs (resp. does not occur) regardless
of the realization of v. Clearly, an equilibrium is efficient (resp. inefficient) if, and only if,
the associated intermediation cost is zero (resp. larger than 1). An equilibrium is partially
efficient if it is neither inefficient nor efficient. Define h(x) = f(x)/[1−F (x)] to be the hazard
rate.
The next result proves existence and provides a complete characterization of equilibrium,
for all networks. E(g, p) denotes the set of essential traders, i.e., a set of traders that lies on
all paths q ∈ Q1. Let e(g, p) = |E(g, p)| be the number of essential traders.
Theorem 2 Assume that the hazard rate is increasing.
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A. Existence: In every network there exists an efficient or a partially efficient equilibrium.
B. Characterization:
1. c(p∗) = 0 is an equilibrium if, and only if, no trader is essential.
2. c(p∗) ∈ (0, 1) is an equilibrium if, and only if, (a) |E(g, p∗)| ≥ 1 and ∀i ∈ E(g, p∗),
p∗i = pˆ
∗, where
pˆ∗ =
1
h(e(g, p∗)pˆ∗)
, (4)
(b) for every non-essential trader i ∈ q, q ∈ Q1, p∗i = 0. (c) for all traders i /∈ q,
∀q ∈ Q1, if i ∈ q′ then c−i(q′∗) ≥ |E(g, p∗)|pˆ.
3. c(p∗) > 1 is an equilibrium, if, and only if, c−i(q, p∗) ≥ 1, ∀i ∈ q, ∀q ∈ Q.
Theorem 2 brings out two important implications of pricing in networks under uncertain
demand.17 The first is that lack of criticality is necessary and sufficient for the existence of
an efficient equilibrium. So, whenever there are critical intermediaries, the equilibrium will
involve some inefficiency. This is novel relative to Theorem 1. The second observation relates
to equilibrium pricing by essential traders: they set a unique common price which solves
condition (4). As c(p∗) ∈ (0, 1), intermediaries always share surplus with S/D.
We now show how pricing, efficiency and division of surplus, vary with the number of
essential traders.
Proposition 1 Assume that the hazard rate is increasing. Suppose p∗ and p′ are two partially
efficient equilibria, with |E∗| > |E ′| essential traders, respectively. Then:
1. Price for essential traders under p∗ is strictly lower than the price under p′.
2. c(p∗) > c(p′). Hence, p∗ is less efficient.
3. The sum of intermediaries payoffs and sum of S/D’s payoffs are both lower under p∗.
This proposition brings out another novel implication of pricing under uncertain demand:
recall that in the benchmark model, there is no systematic relation between number of essential
traders and prices and intermediation costs (refer to Theorem 1).
17All parts of the result, except for part [2] continue to hold if we relax the increasing hazard rate assumption.
In part [2] we exploit the increasing hazard rate assumption for the sufficiency part of the proof only.
20
A 
B 
C 
D 
A B 
C 
D E 
F 
A B C D 
E 
F G H 
J 
A B 
C 
D E 
F 
a1 
a2 b1 
b2 
c1 
c2 
d1 
d2 e1 
e2 
f1 
f2 
          RING 4      RING 6 
         RING 10 RING with HUBS & SPOKES 
I 
    LINE 6      LINE 8 
Figure 4: Networks in uncertain demand case
4.1 Uncertain Demand in the Laboratory
4.1.1 Experimental design and procedures
We study the effects of uncertain demand on pricing, the division of surplus and efficiency of
trade. In particular, we test the new theoretical predictions on equal pricing and on partially
efficient equilibrium. With this in mind, in addition to rings of size 4, 6, 10 and the Ring with
Hubs and Spokes, we also consider Line networks with 6 and 8 traders.18 Figure 4 presents
these networks.
Recall that in ring networks there always exists an efficient equilibrium, but in rings with
6 and 10 traders there are also inefficient and partially efficient equilibria. In Lines and in
Ring with Hubs and Spokes (with critical intermediaries) an efficient equilibrium does not
exist, but there exists a partially efficient equilibrium. The frequency of trade declines with
the number of critical traders in this equilibrium. These observations motivate the following
question.
18In the Line network with 6 and 8 traders, the pair S and D are always the two end nodes and computer-
generated agents.
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Session
Treatment 1 2 3 4 Total
Ring 4 16 / 240 24 / 360 40 / 600
Ring 6 18 / 180 18 / 180 36 / 360
Ring 10 30 / 180 30 / 180 60 / 360
Ring w. Hubs/Spokes 18 / 180 18 / 180 24 / 240 30 / 300 90 / 900
Line 6 16 / 240 20 / 300 36 / 540
Line 8 18 / 180 18 / 180 36 / 360
Table 6: Treatments with uncertain demand
Question 1A: In the presence of uncertain demand, how does the efficiency of trade vary
with ring size and the presence of critical traders?
Our theoretical analysis reveals that in equilibrium, all essential traders –critical and non-
critical – must set the same price and that this price declines in the number of essential traders.
This motivates our second question:
Question 2A: In the presence of uncertain demand, how does pricing vary with network
location and number of critical traders?
4.1.2 Procedures
The experiment was run at the Experimental Laboratory of the University of Essex (ES-
SEXLab; http://www.essex.ac.uk/essexlab/) in May and October 2013. The subjects in the
experiment were recruited from the ESSEXLab pool consisting undergraduate and masters
students across all disciplines at the University of Essex. The experimental procedures follow
the one we have discussed in Section 2.3; sample instructions are reported in Online Appendix
I. We note that in the experiment the value of exchange v is randomly drawn to be an integer
between 1 and 100 at the beginning of each round. Table 6 summarizes the experimental de-
sign and treatments. In each cell we report number of subjects / number of group observations
in a session.
4.1.3 Findings
We start with an examination of efficiency of trade. Table 7 presents data on the frequency
of trade across the different networks. We split the data of Ring with Hubs and Spokes
with respect to the number of paths. The cases in which there is only one path between S
and D correspond to line networks with one or two critical intermediaries. In Table 7 and
subsequently, we refer to these cases as Line 3 and Line 4, respectively. We refer to all other
cases as belonging to Ring with Hubs and Spokes.
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Network #Paths All ( ≥ 2) 2 3 4 5 6 7
0.89 0.89 -- -- -- -- --
(600) (600)
0.73 0.74 0.69 -- -- -- --
(360) (234) (126)
0.64 0.73 0.62 0.60 0.57 -- --
(360) (108) (114) (91) (47)
0.51 -- 0.60 0.47 0.45 -- --
(504) (158) (270) (76)
0.65 0.65 -- -- -- -- --
(227) (227)
0.53 -- 0.53 -- -- -- --
(169) (169)
0.36 -- -- -- 0.36 -- --
(540) (540)
0.25 -- -- -- -- -- 0.25
(360) (360)
Line 8 1
Notes. The number of group observations is reported in parentheses. #Paths denotes the number of paths connecting
buyer and seller. The samples of Line 3 and 4 are from sessions with Ring with Hubs and Spokes.
Ring with Hubs
and Spokes
Line 3
Line 4
1
Ring 10 2
2
1
Line 6 1
minimum distance between buyer and seller
Ring 4 2
Ring 6 2
Table 7: Frequency of trade
Our first observation is that, for fixed a network architecture, the distance between S and
D has a significant impact on efficiency. In the Ring network with 10 traders, frequency of
trade declines from 0.73 to 0.57 as we move from distance 2 to distance 5. In the Ring with
Hubs and Spokes the frequency falls from 0.60 to 0.45 as we move from distance 3 to distance
5. In line networks, the frequency of trade falls from 0.65 to 0.25 as we move from distance
2 to distance 6. Our second observation is on the effects of critical intermediaries. For fixed
distance, the frequency of trade in a ring network and in a line network is very different. The
frequency of trade in Ring with Hubs and Spokes lies somewhere between that in rings and
in lines, for each fixed distance.
To draw out more clearly the effects of distance and the number of critical traders on
efficiency, we compare efficiency between ring networks and line networks in Figure 5.19 We
calculate the frequency of trade in ring networks after pooling all the observations in rings
with 4, 6 and 10 traders where the length of the shortest path between S and D is the same
(circles on the dotted line in Figure 5). The frequency of trade declines with distance. We
also present the frequency of trade in lines networks (squares on the solid line in Figure 5).
We note that the frequency of trade is lower at every distance level and that the gradient
remains significant all the way through. To summarize:
19In the online Appendix we report average intermediation costs (see Table 14) and average prices for
network location (see Table 15) over time and across treatments.
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Figure 5: Efficiency and distance
Finding 1A: In the presence of uncertain demand, networks have large effects on efficiency.
The frequency of the trade falls with distance and falls even more sharply with the number of
critical traders.
We now turn to the pricing behavior of traders by focusing on the last 20 rounds. We first
present average prices of different types of intermediaries in the Ring networks and the Ring
with Hubs and Spokes. This is presented in Figure 6. In addition, we report in Table 8 the
regression results of prices on dummies for critical intermediaries and non-critical intermediary
on a shorter path, respectively. We control for individual heterogeneity by including dummies
for individual subjects. As in our benchmark experiment, there is clear evidence that subjects
responded strategically to the distances of two paths. Intermediaries on a shorter path chose
higher prices that appear proportionate to the difference in distance between two paths. In
all the networks, this difference in prices chosen by those on a shorter path and on a longer
path is statistically significant. As a consequence, trade often occurs along the longer path.
Our next finding pertains to pricing by critical versus non-critical traders in the Ring with
Hubs and Spokes. We find that critical intermediaries chose prices that are similar to non-
critical traders on a shorter path or to all non-critical traders when two paths are of equal
distance. In all trading cases except for the case of (#Cr, d (q) , d (q′)) = (2, 4, 6), we cannot
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Figure 6: Pricing behavior in Rings and Ring with Hubs and Spokes
reject the null hypothesis either that prices chosen by critical intermediaries and non-critical
ones on a shorter path are equal or that critical intermediaries chose the same price as non-
critical intermediaries when two paths are of equal distance. These findings are in line with
the predictions of the theory.
Next, we examine the pricing behavior in Line networks. Theorem 2 (in a partially efficient
equilibrium) predicts the declining patterns of prices in distance: 50 in Line 3; 33.3 in Line
4; 20 in Line 6; and 14.3 in Line 8. Figure 7 presents the sample average of prices with
95 percent confidence interval across Line networks, along with the theoretically predicted
price. As theory predicts, average prices fall with distance between S and D: 34 in Line 2;
24 in Line 3; 17 in Line 6; 13 in Line 8. However, average prices quantitatively depart from
the predictions in a manner that subjects under-price relative to the equilibrium. The gap
between empirical prices and equilibrium prices shrinks with distance. We shall return to
these departures in the next section.
We finally turn to the empirical investigation of the theoretical prediction that critical
traders across different positions set a common price. We focus on Line 6 and Line 8 networks
for this analysis. Table 9 reports the regression results of prices on dummies for network
positions, using the last 20 rounds of the data. The average prices in position A of Line 6 and
Line 6 networks are, respectively, about 20 and 13. The coefficients of position dummies are
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Ring 6
Dependent variable: price (2, 4) (2, 8) (3, 7) (4, 6) (3,5) (4,4) (4,6) (5,5)
(1) Non-critical & on a shorter path 13.644 19.086 9.017 6.977 10.492 4.511
(2.567)*** (3.281)*** (1.734)*** (2.187)*** (1.689)*** (2.035)**
(2) Critical 11.318 2.840 8.598 -1.278
(1.689)*** (2.315) (1.677)*** (2.233)
Constant 15.645 7.750 10.357 1.907 6.647 7.449 7.536 9.000
(1.943)*** (3.233)** (2.928)*** (2.338) (1.136)*** (0.754)*** (0.918)*** (0.397)***
H 0 : (1) = (2) or H 0 : (2) = 0 0.679 0.223 0.029 0.568
(p -value)
R-squared 0.1416 0.387 0.349 0.312 0.326 0.345 0.223 0.376
Number of obs. 312 280 312 200 280 145 378 144
Notes: Each regression controls for individual heterogeneity by including dummies for individual subjects. Robust standard errors, are reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level.
Ring 10 Ring with Hubs and Spokes
#Cr = 1 #Cr = 2
Table 8: Regressions of pricing on network position
not significantly away from zero and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the equivalence
of prices between any two positions in each Line network at an usual significance level.
We summarize the pricing behavior in networks with demand uncertainty as follows.
Finding 2A: ( i) Subjects responded strategically to the distances of two paths. Critical traders
and non-critical traders on a shorter path set similar prices, while non-critical traders on a
longer path set much lower prices. ( ii) Average prices in Line networks decline in distance,
as theory predicts. However, average prices are lower than equilibrium prices; the gap between
them shrinks with distance.
5 Explaining the Pricing Behavior
We have found that subjects’ behavior conforms to equilibrium predictions broadly and that
the number of critical traders has powerful effects on economic outcomes. However, pricing
behavior does depart significantly from equilibrium predictions: one, intermediation costs
depart from both 0 and 100, and two, in the uncertain demand case prices set by critical
traders are systematically lower than equilibrium prediction. In this section we argue that
risk aversion and noisy best response help provide an explanation for these departures.
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Figure 7: Pricing behavior in Line networks
Line 6 Line 8
Dependent variable: price (d(q) = 5) (d(q) = 7)
Constant 19.579 12.753
(0.939)*** (1.212)***
Position B 0.029 -1.030
(0.686) (0.772)
Position C -0.383 -0.588
(0.684) (0.775)
Position D 0.362 -0.006
(0.781) (0.849)
Position E -0.205
(0.758)
Position F -0.764
(0.777)
R-squared 0.200 0.190
Number of obs. 720 720
Notes: Each regression controls for individual heterogeneity by including
dummies for individual subjects. Robust standard errors, are reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level.
Table 9: Regressions of pricing in line network
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Equilibrium
Networks Average prices ρ = 0 ρ = 0.5
Line 3 32.21 50 33.33
Line 4 22.14 33.33 25
Line 6 16.84 20 16.67
Line 8 13.32 14.29 12.50
Table 10: Risk Aversion and Prices in Line Networks
5.1 Risk aversion
The experimental literature shows that people exhibit moderate levels of risk aversion in
decisions involving even small stakes in a strategic environment (e.g., Goeree et al. (2002,
2003)) as well as in a non-strategic environment (e.g., Holt and Laury (2002)). We explore
the effects of risk-aversion in our setting, first theoretically and then estimate a model of risk
aversion from our data.
Suppose that individual subjects share a common degree of risk aversion, characterized
by the following power utility function: u (x; ρ) = x
1−ρ
1−ρ , where ρ ≥ 0 represents the CRRA
coefficient. In a Line network with η intermediaries, the equilibrium price of each intermediary
i and the associated intermediation cost are
p∗i =
1− ρ
(η + 1)− ηρ and c (p
∗) =
η (1− ρ)
(η + 1)− ηρ.
It is possible to verify that both equilibrium price and intermediation cost decrease in ρ.20
In order to get a sense of how risk aversion comes into play, Table 10 compares average
prices in the data with equilibrium prices for two different levels of risk aversion – when ρ = 0
(risk neutral) and when ρ = 0.5. We observe that a moderate level of risk aversion can provide
a much better fit with the observed prices. Applying the argument of risk aversion to other
networks is less transparent due to the multiplicity of equilibrium. In the next section, we
combine risk-aversion with a model of noisy best response.
5.2 Strategic uncertainty
We study a standard model of noisy best response. The model makes two key assumptions.
First, that each intermediary forms consistent beliefs about the behavior of traders occupying
distinct locations in a network. Beliefs are consistent in the sense that they correspond to
20The derivation of the equilibrium with risk aversion follows along the lines of the proof of Theorem 2; the
details are omitted.
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the empirical distribution of choices from the data.21 Second, we assume that a trader makes
errors in choosing a price and that the probability of choosing a particular price depends
positively on its associated payoff. We further assume the conventional logistic choice function
with payoff-sensitivity parameter λ ≥ 0; as λ approaches 0 choice behavior becomes purely
random, while as λ goes to the infinity, the individual chooses a best response with certainty.22
Further details of the model are given in Appendix III.
We combine the model of strategic uncertainty with risk aversion by assuming the above
power utility function and estimate the payoff-sensitivity parameters (λs) and the CRRA
coefficients (ρs). We pool the data of all ring networks to estimate a single common CRRA
coefficients in each experiment. We do the same with the data on all line networks under
demand uncertainty. For the Ring with Hubs and Spokes, we focus on the samples of those
trading situations where critical and non-critical intermediaries co-exist. With regard to
decision-error parameters, we allow them to vary across distinct trading situations because
they entail different strategic incentives.
Table 11 presents the maximum likelihood estimation results of the benchmark experiment
and the experiment with demand uncertainty. In the estimation we use the last 30 rounds of
the samples and we discretize the choice data to be the set of integer numbers, ranging from 0
to 100, by rounding observe choices to their nearest integer. We report the estimated ρ and λs
and their standard errors, along with the maximized log likelihood value, in each estimation
case. We use the bootstrap method in computing standard errors with 500 replications. To
see how the model fits the data, we present the difference of average price and predicted price
and its 95% confidence interval in each trading situation.
First, subjects in our experiments exhibit a moderate level of risk aversion. The estimated
CRRA coefficients range from 0.46 (for ring networks of the benchmark experiment) to 0.67
(for ring networks with uncertain demand). The CRRA estimate of line networks is around
0.61. These estimates are similar to those reported in the literature.23
21For instance, in Ring 10 network where S and D are B and H, intermediary A forms beliefs about the
behaviors of two distinct traders–trader on the shorter path and trader on the longer path. These beliefs are
consistent with empirical distributions of the behaviors of traders on a shorter path and on the longer path.
22We have tried to develop a stochastic equilibrium model such as Quantal Response equilibrium (QRE),
proposed by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). Solving such an equilibrium is complicated because it requires us to
find a distribution from a system of equations involving the convolutions of multiple probability distributions.
A numerical approach is also computationally demanding. This practical challenge leads us to adopt a non-
equilibrium model of noisy best response under strategic uncertainty.
23Goeree et al. (2002, 2003) report ρ = 0.52 and 0.44 for first-price private value auctions and asymmetric
matching pennies games, respectively. Holt and Laury (2002) report that most of their subjects in their
lottery-choice experiment exhibit risk aversion corresponding to the 0.15− 0.68 range of CRRA coefficient.
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ρ (St. Err.) λ
(sample mean - 
predicted mean)
ρ (St. Err.) λ
(sample mean - 
predicted mean)
& Log 
likelihood
(St. Err.) [95% CI]
& Log 
likelihood
(St. Err.) [95% CI]
10.30 -9.26 34.17 -6.23
(0.72) [-10.12, -8.30] (6.68) [-7.32, -5.30]
5.88 2.63 16.12 -1.03
(0.69) [1.18, 4.12] (2.91) [-3.43, 0.78]
33.94 -2.47 84.11 -1.43
(2.87) [-4.80, -0.84] (22.28) [-4.44, -0.26]
14.76 0.56 35.01 -2.59
(1.00) [-0.54, 1.50] (6.99) [-4.57, -1.81]
9.06 2.07 14.78 -1.36
0.667 (2.03) [-0.92, 4.33] 0.461 (5.72) [-18.91, 4.53]
(0.018) 269.12 -1.03 (0.062) 149.00 -4.80
& (76.88) [-2.48, 0.07] & (51.75) [-13.40, -0.60]
-9860.7 16.56 -1.82 -6482.5 12.62 -8.35
(1.91) [-4.42, 0.15] (1.06) [-11.96, -4.68]
115.79 0.13 103.96 -1.06
(23.69) [-0.80, 0.89] (27.32) [-2.39, -0.15]
15.63 -4.10 7.49 -19.42
(1.11) [-6.49, -1.97] (0.48) [-23.08, -13.89]
54.61 -0.06 103.55 -0.39
(7.30) [-1.83, 1.19] (29.98) [-3.58, 0.28]
38.86 -0.27 64.00 -0.67
(2.45) [-1.34, 0.69] (11.66) [-1.54, -0.04]
38.84 -3.86 7.97 -5.69
(6.18) [-5.99, -1.88] (1.73) [-7.10, -4.51]
13.84 1.16 5.62 -3.71
(1.86) [-0.58, 2.50] (1.84) [-7.77, -0.57]
72.59 -1.92 56.35 -1.50
(8.79) [-3.80, -0.39] (23.67) [-3.84, 0.18]
17.09 -8.97 3.29 -11.23
0.578 (4.51) [-12.56, -5.63] 0.480 (0.80) [-15.27, -7.65]
(0.023) 27.69 -0.96 (0.078) 23.80 -0.47
& (2.55) [-2.21, -0.03] & (5.62) [-1.57, 0.15]
-5054.3 27.44 -2.07 -2036.3 16.60 0.20
(3.68) [-3.68, -0.59] (3.65) [-2.88, 3.54]
21.66 0.75 9.22 -2.88
(3.01) [-0.93, 1.81] (2.37) [-7.55, -0.12]
125.45 -2.63 58.96 -1.45
(19.44) [-5.13, -0.61] (21.04) [-6.31, 0.15]
26.23 -5.83 11.44 -5.28
(3.29) [-9.01, -2.83] (3.16) [-9.24, -1.86]
38.78 0.26 24.38 -1.34
(3.99) [-1.19, 1.47] (5.98) [-2.74, -0.53]
16.71 1.10
(2.95) [-1.12, 3.17]
0.608 32.17 -0.98
(0.010) (5.45) [-2.68, 0.73]
& 49.38 -0.14
-8034.1 (2.11) [-0.57, 0.36]
69.72 0.20
(2.75) [-0.16, 0.57]
Ring with 
Hubs & 
Spokes
Line
(1,1,2,--) Critical
(2,1,3,--) Critical
(4,1,5,--) Critical
(6,1,7,--) Critical
(2, 2, 5, 5)
Critical
Non-critical
Benchmark experiment
Critical
3 / non-critical
5 / non-critical
(2, 2, 4, 6)
Critical
4 / non-critical
6 / non-critical
(1, 2, 4, 4)
Critical
Non-critical
(1, 2, 3, 5)
Ring 10
(2, 8)
2
8
(3, 7)
3
7
(4, 6)
4
6
(5, 5) 5
Ring 6
(2, 4)
2
4
(3, 3) 3
Network
(#Cr,#Paths, 
d(q),d(q'))
Distance of own 
path / criticality
Experiment with demand uncertainty
Ring 4 (2, 2) 2
Table 11: Estimation of strategic uncertainty model with risk aversion
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Second, Table 11 shows that the estimated λs are large and significant for all trading situ-
ations, suggesting that the subjects in the experiments responded ‘optimally’ against others’
pricing.
Third, the estimated model replicates closely the average prices of the data. In most of
the trading situations, the difference between empirical and predicted average prices is small:
the difference is less than 5 in 37 cases out of a total of 46 distinct situations. In the majority
of cases, we cannot reject the null hypothesis for the equivalence of empirical and predicted
average prices at 5% significance level.
Finally, we plot the predicted distribution of prices and the observed prices, to get a
further sense of the quality of the match between our model and subjects’s behavior. The
overall quality of the match between the model and the experimental data appears to be good,
across the different treatments. This fit is particularly good in the case of pure market power
as represented in the line networks. Figures 8 and 9 in the online appendix present a selective
set of these plots from both experiments.
6 Conclusion
We propose a general model of posted prices in networks of intermediaries. Our theoret-
ical analysis provides a complete characterization of posted price equilibrium for arbitrary
structures of intermediation. This is a first step towards understanding the functioning of
intermediated networks. Our experiments complement our theoretical work and point to node
criticality as an organizing principle for understanding pricing, efficiency and the division of
surplus in networked markets.
Our model extends naturally the case of an arbitrary number of source-destination pairs.
The key assumption is that traders know the location of the source-destination in the network,
and can discriminate based on this location. In some applications, traders set prices that
apply uniformly to all intermediated trades, independently of the location of the origin and
destination. An example of uniform prices are road tolls: two drivers who use a bridge
across a river will pay the same amount, irrespective of where they started or where they
are subsequently planning to go. This motivates the study of pricing in a model where the
network origin and destination of trades is unknown.
In a companion paper, Choi et al. (2014), we study this setting. We suppose that all
traders simultaneously post prices: the price that a trader sets applies to all potential trades
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that go through him. Once prices are set, a S/D pair is picked at random from the set of
all traders. As before, a feasible least cost path is picked. Given a profile of prices, a trader
faces the following trade-off. A higher price raises the payoff if trade does take place, but it
rules out long distance trade, between farther away S/D pairs. The theory and experiments
suggest that location uncertainty leads to breakdown of long distance trade and creates large
losses in efficiency.
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Appendix I: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1:
Existence: If C = ∅, set p∗i = 0 for all i ∈ N . Note that no intermediary can earn positive
profits by deviating and setting a positive price, because, since there are no critical traders,
there is always an alternative zero cost path. If C 6= ∅, then consider a price profile p∗ such
that p∗i = 0 if i /∈ C, and for j ∈ C set p∗j so that
∑
j∈C p
∗
j = 1. It is easily checked that no
critical or non-critical intermediary has a profitable deviation from this profile.
Characterization: We first show that c∗(p∗) ∈ (0, 1) cannot be sustained in equilibrium.
We consider two cases.
Case 1: Suppose |Q∗| = 1; in this case a trader i on q ∈ Q∗ can raise his price slightly and
strictly increase payoffs.
Case 2: Suppose |Q∗| > 1; consider a path q ∈ Q∗ and fix a trader i ∈ q with pi > 0. Note
that such a trader always exists, given that c(p∗) > 0. We have two possibilities:
2a: If intermediary i is essential, he can raise his price slightly and he will remain essential as
all other prices remain as before and the sum of prices being less than 1. So there is a strictly
profitable deviation.
2b: If i is not essential, given that |Q∗| > 1, the probability that i is used in exchange is at
most 1/2. If trader i lowers his price slightly, he ensures that he is on the unique feasible least
cost path. Thus the deviation strictly increases payoff.
Now we take up each of the remaining three possibilities with regard to intermediation
costs and characterize the conditions for which they can be sustained in equilibrium.
1. Assume c(p∗) = 0. We first establish sufficiency. In equilibrium every trader makes payoff
0. Consider an increase in price by some intermediary i. As no intermediary is essential under
p, there exists an alternative path between b and s at cost 0, and this path excludes trader i.
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So there is no profitable deviation, and p∗ is an equilibrium.
We now establish necessity. Suppose there is a trader i who is essential under p∗. As c(p∗) = 0,
essential trader i can raise his price slightly, still ensure that exchange takes place through
him, and thereby he strictly raises his payoffs. So p∗ is not an equilibrium.
2. Assume c(p∗) = 1. We first establish sufficiency. Consider intermediary j ∈ q, with q ∈ Q∗.
If p∗j > 0 then intermediary j is essential and so trade occurs with probability 1 via j and he
earns p∗j . If j raises his price then total costs of intermediation exceed 1 and no trade takes
place, yielding a zero payoff to j. If j lowers his price, trade does occur with probability 1
via him, so he only succeeds in lowering his payoff below p∗j . Next consider trader k ∈ q with
q ∈ Q∗ such that pk = 0. It is easily verified that k cannot increase his payoff by raising his
price. Finally, consider l /∈ q, ∀ q ∈ Q∗. This trader earns 0 in p∗. A deviation to a lower
positive price leaves the trade probability via l at 0, as c−l(q′∗) ≥ 1 for all q′ such that l ∈ q′.
We have shown that p∗ is an equilibrium.
We now establish necessity. Suppose j ∈ q, with q ∈ Q∗, p∗j > 0 and j is not essential. So
the probability that exchange occurs via trader j is at most 1/2. Trader j can lower his price
slightly and this will push the probability of trade via himself to 1, and thereby he strictly
raises his payoff. Next consider k /∈ q for all q ∈ Q∗ and suppose c−k(q′∗) < 1 for some
q′ such that k ∈ q′. Under p∗, the payoff to k is 0. But since c(p∗) = 1, there is a price
pk = 1− c−k(q′∗)−  such that, for small  > 0, the probability of trade via k is 1 and pk > 0.
This is therefore a profitable deviation.
3. Assume c(p∗) > 1. We first establish sufficiency. All traders earn 0 under profile p∗. It
can be checked that no deviation to another price can generate positive payoffs given that
c−j(q, p∗) ≥ 1, for all j and for all q ∈ Q. A deviation to price 0 yields payoff 0. This proves
sufficiency.
We now establish necessity. Suppose that c(p∗) > 1 and that there is some j ∈ q such that
c−j(q, p∗) < 1. Then there is a price pj = 1− c−j(p∗)− , for some  > 0 such that trade takes
place via trader j with probability 1 and pj > 0. This constitutes a profitable deviation.

Proof of Theorem 2:
Existence: If there are no critical traders in g, then existence of efficient equilibrium follows
the arguments developed in Theorem 1. If there are critical traders then set pi = 0 for every
non-critical intermediary i, and for every critical intermediary set p∗ = 1/h(ηp∗), where η is
the number of critical players. The constructed profile satisfies part 2. Therefore there always
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exists a partially efficient equilibrium in the presence of critical traders.
Characterization: The proof of Part 1 and Part 3 uses the arguments developed in the proof
of Part 1 and Part 3 of Theorem 1, and are therefore omitted. We now prove Part 2.
First consider necessity. Suppose p∗ is equilibrium and c(p∗) ∈ (0, 1). Take an arbitrary
least cost path q ∈ Q1. Observe that every player i who is not essential and who belongs to
path q must set price 0. For otherwise, a positive price by player i, pi > 0, is dominated by
a slightly lower price p′i < pi, that ensures the path q becomes the unique lowest cost path.
This observation and the hypothesis that c(p∗) > 0, implies that there must exist essential
players, i.e., |E(g, p∗)| ≥ 1, and that c(p∗) = ∑i∈E(g,p∗) p∗i .
Second, the optimal price of an essential player i ∈ E(g, p∗) solves
p∗i = arg max pi[1− F (pi + c∗−i(p∗)]. (5)
It is easy to see that p∗i ∈
(
0, 1− c∗−i(p∗)
)
; the first order condition then says that for all
i ∈ E(g, p),
p∗i =
1− F (c(p∗))
f(c(p∗))
.
But this implies that ∀i, j ∈ E(g, p∗), p∗i = p∗j and p∗i ∈
(
0, 1|E(g,p∗)|
)
. So equilibrium price is
given by
p∗i =
1− F (|E(g, p∗)|p∗)
f(|E(g, p∗)|p∗) .
The existence of such a p∗ ∈
(
0, 1|E(g,p∗)|
)
follows from the assumption that f(·) and F (·)
are both continuous functions and that f(0) > 0. Finally consider an intermediary i who
does not belong to any path in Q1 and suppose that c−i(q′∗) < |E(g, p∗)|p∗ for some path q′
such that i ∈ q′. Then player i can charge a price p = |E(g, p∗)|p∗ − c−i(q′∗)−  > 0 and now
whenever trade occurs it will occur via path q′; hence, this is a strictly profitable deviation for
intermediary i. The proof that these conditions are sufficient is straightforward, given that
the hazard rate is increasing.

Proof of Proposition 1: From Theorem 2 we know that in a partially efficient equilibrium
every essential player sets price, p∗i , such that:
p∗i =
1
h(ηp∗i )
(6)
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where η = |E(g, p∗)| ≥ 1. The assumption of increasing hazard rate implies that there exists
a unique p∗ which solves p∗ = 1/h(ηp∗i ). We now prove the three parts in the proposition.
Part 1. Implicitly differentiating (6) and simplifying yields:
dp∗
dη
= − h
′
(ηp∗i )
h2(ηp∗i ) + h
′(ηp∗i )
< 0, (7)
where the inequality follows from the assumption of increasing hazard rate.
Part 2. Next, note that in a partially efficient equilibrium intermediation costs are ηp∗i and
therefore the probability that trade does not occur is F (ηp∗i ). Again, implicit differentiation
yields
dF (ηp∗i )
dη
= f(ηp∗i )
[
p∗i + η
dp∗i
dη
]
= f(ηp∗i )p
∗
i
[
1− h
′
(ηp∗i )
h2(ηp∗i ) + h′(ηp
∗
i )
]
> 0
where the the second equality follows by substituting the expression for dp
∗
dη
from above, and
the inequality follows from the assumption of increasing hazard rate.
Part 3. The expected payoff of an essential intermediary is p∗[1 − F (ηp∗)]; since inessential
intermediaries obtain a payoff of zero, the join profits of intermediaries are∑
i∈N
Πi(p
∗) = ηp∗[1− F (ηp∗)], (8)
and
d
∑
Πi(p
∗)
dηp∗
= [1− F (ηp∗)]− ηp∗f(ηp∗) = [1− F (ηp∗)](1− η) ≤ 1, (9)
where the second equality follows using equilibrium condition p∗ = 1/h(ηp∗), and the inequal-
ity follows because in a partially efficient equilibrium η ≥ 1. Finally, the joint profit of S and
D is
ΠS(p∗) + ΠD(p∗) = [1− F (ηp∗i )] [E[v|v ≥ ηp∗i ]− ηp∗i ] (10)
=
∫ 1
ηp∗i
xf(x)dx− ηp∗[1− F (ηp∗i )] (11)
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and therefore
d[ΠS(p∗) + ΠD(p∗)]
dηp∗
= −[1− F (ηp∗i )] < 0. (12)

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For Online Publication. Appendix II: Different Trading
Protocols
Bid and Ask Model: In the bid-ask model each intermediary i ∈ N sets (bi, ai) where
bi is trader i’s bid price and ai is trader i’s ask price. Then S accepts the highest bid, as
long as it is non-negative. If there are multiple highest bids, S picks one randomly with
equal probability. D buys as long as the ask is not higher than 1. The object passes from
intermediary i to a connected intermediary j with the highest bid, bj, subject to the condition
that the bid bj ≥ ai. Ties are broken randomly.
For a posted-price equilibrium p∗ let {Ui(p∗)} be the profile of equilibrium utilities. For a
bid-and-ask equilibrium (b∗, a∗) let {Ui(b∗, a∗)} be the profile of equilibrium utilities.
Definition 1. p∗ is payoff equivalent to (b∗, a∗) whenever: 1. Ui(p∗) = Ui(b∗, a∗) for each
i ∈ N and 2. US(p∗) + UD(p∗) = US(b∗, a∗) + UD(b∗, a∗).
Theorem A: Fix a network g. For every posted-price equilibrium p∗ there exists a payoff
equivalent bid-and-ask equilibrium (b∗, a∗).
Proof of Theorem A: Suppose p∗ is an inefficient equilibrium. Then it has to be the case
that every path connecting S andD has a distance strictly higher than two. The corresponding
equilibrium in the bid-ask model is as follows: every agent bids 0 and asks 1.
We now focus on efficient equilibria. Recall from Theorem 1 that efficient equilibria in
posted-price model are extremal.
Case 1 (S and D extract all surplus): For such an outcome under posted-prices, there must be
no critical intermediaries in g. For every path q ∈ Q and for every i ∈ q, set ai = bi = 1. Under
this profile, each intermediary earns 0, S earns 1 and D earns 0, and so this profile is payoff
equivalent to p∗. To show that this profile (b, a) is an equilibrium note that intermediary i
cannot gain by lowering his ask, as each trader connecting to him bids 1. Furthermore, if
trader i lowers his bid, then he will not get the good, because every trader connecting to him
asks 1, and, since there are no critical intermediaries, S is always connected to at least two
intermediaries.
Case 2 (Intermediaries extract all surplus): From our characterization of posted-price equi-
libria we know that there exists q∗ ∈ Q∗ with ∑i∈q∗ p∗i = 1 and that Ui = pi for each i ∈ q∗.
For convenience, label agents in q∗ as {i1, ..., in}, where gSi1 = gi1i2 = ... = ginD = 1. Consider
the following bid-ask profile:
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A. Strategy of traders in q∗: aix = bix+1 for all x = 1, ..., n − 1, and ain = 1, and bix =
1−∑j=ix,...,in p∗j for all x = 1, ..., n.
B. Strategy of traders not in q∗: aj > 1 and bj < 0 for all j /∈ q∗
Our first observation is that under this profile, the good flows from S to D via path q∗ and
the payoff of intermediary ix is
aix − bix = bix+1 − bix = 1−
∑
j=ix+1,...,in
p∗j − (1−
∑
j=ix,...,in
p∗j) = pix ,
where the equalities follows by using the construction of the bid-ask profile (see part A); note
also that all intermediaries who do not belong to q∗ earn 0. So this profile is payoff equivalent
to the posted-price price equilibrium.
We now show that the strategy for every j ∈ q∗ is optimal. Take ix, for some x = 1, ..., n.
Intermediary ix cannot ask more than aix = bix+1 because, all intermediaries not in q
∗ are
bidding strictly below bix+1 (note that if x = n then ain = 1 and clearly increasing the asking
price is not profitable). Intermediary ix cannot change his bid bix either. Indeed, if he decreases
his bid, then trade does not occur because agent ix−1 is asking bix . If he increases the bid,
then he will unambiguously decrease his profits as he will earn a lower margin.
We next show that the strategy is optimal for every j /∈ q∗. The first case is when gjix = 0
for all x = 1...n. This implies that every intermediary connected to j bids strictly less than
0 (see part B of the strategy), and so the maximum profit that j can obtain by deviating
and intermediating trade is 0, which is what he gets under the current strategy. Hence,
intermediary j is playing a best response.
The second case is when gjix = 1 for a unique x = 1...n. Suppose that the link is to a
upstream intermediary along the trading path. If j is not linked to the initial S, then every
downstream intermediary connected to j bids strictly less than 0 (see part B of the strategy),
and so the maximum profit that j can obtain by deviating and intermediating trade is 0,
which is what he earns under the current strategy. Hence, j is playing an optimal strategy.
If j is also linked to S, then it has to be the case that in the posted price equilibrium
pi1 = ... = pix = 0. This holds because i1, ..., ix are in the feasible least cost path and they
are competing with j. Part A of the strategy then implies that bix = 0 and therefore every
intermediary to which j can sell the object bids, at most, zero which implies that his maximum
payoff from buying and reselling is zero, e.g., so aj > 1 and bj < 0 is a best reply.
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The last and third case is when gjix = 1 for at least two x = 1...n. In this case we can adopt
the last argument developed to show that there is no profitable deviation. This concludes the
proof. 
We now develop two examples to show that the converse of Theorem A is not true: there
exist equilibrium outcomes in the bid-and-ask model that cannot be sustained in the posted-
price model.
Example 1: Consider a network where S has at least two links and there is at least one
critical intermediary. We know that in the posted-price price model, intermediaries extract
all surplus in every efficient equilibrium. Consider now the bid-and-ask model and set the
following bid-ask profile: all intermediaries set a bid of 1 and an ask of 1. Under this profile
the outcome is efficient, the intermediaries obtain zero payoff and S obtains the entire surplus.
It is easy to verify that this is an equilibrium. 
Example 2: Consider a network where there are η > 1 paths between s and b, each interme-
diary belongs only to one path and each of these paths contains at least two intermediaries.
Rings where the shortest distance between b and s is strictly greater than 2 are an example of
such networks with η = 2. In the bid-and-ask model consider the following profile: 1. every
intermediary bids b ∈ (0, 1), 2. every intermediary connected to D sets an ask a = 1, and 3.
every intermediary not connected to D sets an ask of b.
To see that this is equilibrium first consider an intermediary that is not linked to D and is
not linked to S. Such intermediary can resell the object at b and therefore it is not profitable
to bid more than b. If they bid b they get zero. If they bid less than b they also get zero
because each intermediary posts an ask of b. Consider an intermediary linked to S. If he bids
b he gets 0. If he raises his bid, he makes a negative profit because he can resell the object at
most at b. If he lowers his bid, he earns zero because S sells to another intermediary. Finally
consider an intermediary linked to D. Posting an ask of 1 to D is clearly optimal. So, if the
intermediary bids b he gets 1 − b. Increasing the bid lowers the intermediary margin, while
decreasing the bid leads zero payoff because intermediaries ask b.
This bid-and-ask equilibrium is efficient and in this equilibrium S gets 1 − b, each inter-
mediary not connected to the final D earns 0, and each intermediary connected to the final D
earns b/η (because S picks an intermediary with equal probability across all the η paths). 
Definition 2. The bid-ask model is payoff equivalent to the posted-price price model in
network g if the set of equilibrium payoffs in the two models are the same.
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We now show that in a wide class of networks, the bid-ask model is payoff equivalent to
the posted-price model.
Example 3: Networks with only critical intermediaries. Suppose there is only one
path between S and D. The equilibrium with trade in the bid-and-ask model must entail full
extraction of surplus by intermediaries. This is because the intermediary linked to s must set
bid at 0 and the intermediary connected to D must set an ask of 1. The corresponding payoff
outcome can be sustained in the posted-price price model. 
Example 4: Network with multiple Bertrand paths. Suppose that there are at least two
paths each with a sole intermediary, no other restrictions are imposed about the architecture
of the network. We claim that in all such networks the bid-ask model is payoff equivalent to
the posted-pricemodel.
S must earn the entire surplus in every equilibrium of the bid-and-ask model. Suppose
there is an equilibrium where S earns surplus b < 1. This implies that the highest bid that s
receives is b. Next note that there must exist one of the intermediary in the sole intermediary
path, say intermediary i, who must intermediate trade with probability strictly less than 1,
and whenever i intermediates trade he must get at most 1 − b (because 1 − b is the surplus
left after S sold the object). If intermediary i sets a bid slightly above b he will intermediate
trade with probability 1 and so he will strictly gain.
So, in every bid-and-ask equilibrium S earns the entire surplus and all other intermediaries
earn zero. This outcome can be supported in the posted-price model because the network has
no critical intermediaries (as there are two paths, each with a sole intermediary). 
Example 5. Competitive Multipartite networks. We define a k-multipartite network as
follows: there are L ≥ 1 layers of intermediation between S and D. Let nx denote the number
of nodes in layer ` ∈ {1, 2, .., L}. By construction n` ≥ 1, for all `. Every intermediary in
layer 1 is connected to S and a subset of intermediaries in layer 2. Every intermediary in layer
L is linked to D and a subset of intermediaries in layer L − 1. Every intermediary in each
layer 1 < ` < L− 1, is connected to a subset of intermediaries in layer `− 1 and a subset of
intermediaries in layer `+ 1, respectively.
When n` = 1 for all ` = 1...L we obtain the Line network as discussed in Example 3. Here
our interest is in competitive multipartite networks: n` ≥ 2 for each ` ∈ {1, ..., L} and each
node in layer ` is connected to all nodes in layer `− 1, for all ` ∈ {2, ...L}.
We now show that in these class of graphs the bid-and-ask model is payoff equivalent to
the posted-price price model. First, a competitive multipartite network with only one layer of
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intermediation is a special case of the class of networks described in Example 4 and therefore
the claim follows. Second, suppose there is more than one layer. Since each path between D
and S contains at least two intermediaries, there is always a bid-and-ask equilibrium which is
inefficient, e.g., each intermediary bids b < 0 and ask a > 1. An inefficient equilibrium exists
also in the posted-price model.
We conclude by showing that in every efficient equilibrium of the bid-and-ask model S
extracts all the surplus. First, note that each intermediary in layer L can resell the object at
an ask of 1 (as they are directly connected to D). Second, since each intermediary in layer
L is connected to all intermediaries in layer L − 1, it must be the case that the highest bid
across L-layer intermediaries is 1. In fact, since the equilibrium is efficient, the object will
arrive at layer L − 1 with probability 1 and, if the highest bid across L-layer intermediaries
is strictly below 1, then one of them strictly gains by posting a slightly higher bid. Since the
highest bid across L-layer intermediaries is 1 and since all intermediaries in layer L− 1 access
all intermediaries in layer L, every L− 1-layer intermediary can resell the object at a price of
1. So every intermediary in layer L− 1 must set ask 1 and correspondingly set a bid of 1. We
can then iterate the argument above to show that, for every layer ` ∈ 2, ..., L the bid and ask
is set equal to 1. Hence, S must earn the entire surplus. This outcome is sustainable in the
posted-price model if all intermediaries set a price pi = 0. It is easily verified that this price
profile is an equilibrium in the competitive multi-partite network. 
Sequential second price auction: Consider the following model which is the com-
plete information version of the model of Kotowski and Leister (2012). Two nodes S and
D are connected in a complete multipartite network, i.e. a multipartite network as defined
in Example 5 above. Node S has an indivisible object. S and all intermediaries have no
consumption value for the object whereas buyer D has a consumption value v.24
Trading occurs via a sequence of second price, sealed-bid auctions: first S runs an auction
where intermediaries in layer ` = 1 bid, the winner of this auction runs an auction where
intermediaries in layer ` = 2 bid, and so on. It is assumed that the intermediary in the last
layer L who eventually owns the object sells it to D at a price of v. It follows that if there is
only one intermediary in a layer, then the intermediary obtains the object at a price of 0.
For a given strategy profile, define the resale value of an intermediary in layer ` as the profit
24Kotowski and Leister (2012) suppose that each intermediary has either a low or high transaction cost.
Low transaction cost is normalized to zero; high transaction cost is a number above v. The level of such cost
is private information of the intermediary, but it is common knowledge that an intermediary has a low cost
with probability p. In this section we have assumed that p = 1
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that he anticipates to make if he wins the auction. The following proposition characterizes
(sub-game perfect) equilibrium where each intermediary bids his resale value. A complete
multipartite network, has critical intermediaries if, and only if, n` = 1 for some ` ∈ {1, ..., L}.
When there are critical intermediaries, let `∗ be the largest index such that n`∗ = 1, i.e., the
intermediary in layer `∗ is critical and there are no critical intermediaries in layer ` > `∗.
Theorem B. Consider a complete multi-partite network with L ≥ 1 layers and suppose
(n1, ..., nL) is the distribution of intermediaries across the layers.
1. If there are no critical intermediaries then it is an equilibrium for every intermediary to
bid v. In this equilibrium S earns the entire surplus.
2. If there are critical intermediaries, then it is an equilibrium for an intermediary in layer
` ∈ {`∗, ..., L} to bids v and each intermediary in layer ` ∈ {1, ..., `∗ − 1} bids 0 is an
equilibrium. In this equilibrium critical intermediary in layer `∗ earns the entire surplus.
Proof of Theorem B: Suppose C = ∅. The resale value of an intermediary in layer L is v
because, by assumption, an intermediary in the last layer re-sells to D at a price v. Consider
then the auction run by an intermediary in layer L − 1. Since C = ∅, there are at least two
bidders in the auction and their valuation is v. As standard, bidding v is a best reply and the
profit of the seller is v. Hence, the resale value of each intermediary in layer L− 1 is v. The
proof follows by iterating this argument.
Next, suppose C 6= ∅. The argument developed in the previous paragraph holds for every
auction run starting from an intermediary in layer ` ∈ {`∗, ..., L−1}. Now consider the auction
run by intermediary in layer `∗ − 1. Note that, since intermediary in `∗ is critical, he buys
the object at 0, regardless of his bid. Hence, bidding v is a best reply. This also implies that
the resale value of each intermediary in layer `∗ − 1 is 0. It is not easy to see that in the
auction run by an intermediary in layer `∗− 2, intermediaries in layer `∗− 1 play a best reply
by bidding 0, which, in turns, implies a resale value of each intermediary in layer `∗− 2 equal
to 0. Iterating the argument we conclude the proof. 
We now relate this result to our posted price model. Theorem 1 tells us that in the complete
multipartite networks the presence of critical traders implies that in an efficient equilibrium
intermediaries extract the entire surplus. The distribution across nodes is not tied down. So,
in the auction model, if intermediaries bid their valuation then the equilibrium corresponds
to the efficient equilibrium of our posted price model with a very specific division of surplus:
the last critical intermediary earns the entire surplus.
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For Online Publication. Appendix III: Strategic uncer-
tainty
In the model of strategic uncertainty we make the following two assumptions. First,
each trader is assumed to form beliefs about the behaviors of other traders, consistent with
their actual behaviors. Second, each trader make errors in choosing his own choice and the
probability of choosing a particular price is positively associated with its corresponding payoff.
We focus on the trading setting with demand uncertainty where the surplus is unknown and
drawn from a distribution Fv (·) on the interval [0, 100]. Given a utility function u, the
expected utility of intermediary i with his price pi is
Π˜i (pi) = u (pi)×Bi (pi) ,
where Bi (pi) denotes intermediary i’s beliefs about himself being used for trade. The precise
form of this depends on a network g. We denote F−j as intermediary i’s beliefs (joint dis-
tribution) about the pricing behaviors of all other intermediaries in a network. We start by
considering Line networks.
Line networks. Consider a line network with η ≥ 1 intermediaries. The probability of
intermediary i being used for trade is then given by
Bi (pi) =
∫
v∈[0,100]
∫
p−i
1
{
pi +
∑
j 6=i
pj ≤ v
}
dF−idFv,
where 1 {·} is an indicator function.
Ring networks. Consider a trading situation (d (q1) , d (q2)) in a ring network where
there are n1 ≥ 1 and n2 ≥ 1 numbers of intermediaries in paths q1 and q2, respectively. Fix
intermediary i ∈ q1. The probability of intermediary i being used for trade is then given by
Bi (pi) =
∫
v∈[0,100]
∫
p−i
1
{
pi +
∑
j 6=i,j∈q1 pj ≤ v
&
∑
j∈q1 pj ≤
∑
k∈q2 pk
}
dF−idFv.
Ring with Hubs and Spokes. Consider first a critical intermediary i in a trading
situation (d (q1) , d (q2)) in a ring network where there are n1 ≥ 2 and n2 ≥ 2 numbers of
intermediaries in paths q1 and q2, respectively. The probability of critical intermediary i
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being used for trade is
Bi (pi) =
∫
v∈[0,100]
∫
p−i
1
{
pi + min
{ ∑
j 6=i,j∈q1
pj,
∑
k 6=i,k∈q2
pk
}
≤ v
}
dF−idFv.
If intermediary i is non-critical and i ∈ q1, the probability of non-critical intermediary i being
used for trade is
Bi (pi) =
∫
v∈[0,100]
∫
p−i
1
{
pi +
∑
j 6=i,j∈q1 pj ≤ v
&
∑
j∈q1 pj ≤
∑
k∈q2 pk
}
dF−idFv.
In estimating the model of strategic uncertainty with the experimental data,25 we assume
that intermediary i makes a stochastic choice, modelled by a conventional logistic function:
Pr {pi = s} =
exp
(
λΠ˜i (s)
)
∑100
t=0 exp
(
λΠ˜i (t)
) ,
where λ is a payoff-sensitivity parameter in choice function. If λ goes to zero, the pricing
choice becomes purely random. If λ goes to the infinity, the individual chooses an optimal
price with probability 1. In the estimation, we assume that each individual intermediary forms
consistent beliefs about the behaviors of other traders across distinct trading positions in a
network. Beliefs are consistent in the sense that they correspond to empirical distributions of
choices from the experiment. We also assume that individual traders share the power utility
function
u (x; ρ) =
x1−ρ
1− ρ ,
where ρ represents the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) coefficient.
We use the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) method to estimate the payoff-sensitivity
parameters and the CRRA coefficient of the model of strategic uncertainty with stochastic
choice. Let the data consist of m number of distinct trading positions, k1, ..., km, in each of
which there are nki number of price choices, {pki}
nki
ki=1
. Given the above formulas of expected
25In the estimation we discretize the experimental data to be the set of integer numbers, ranging from 0 to
100, by rounding observed choices to their nearest integer.
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payoffs and logistic choice function, we can then construct the log-likelihood function:
L
(
ρ, λk1 , ..., λkm ;
{{pki}nkiki=1}mi=1) = m∑
i=1
nki∑
ki=1
{
100∑
t=0
1 {pki = t} × log (Pr {pki = t})
}
.
The set of parameters, (ρ, λk1 , ..., λkm), are chosen to maximize the log-likelihood function.
Table 10 in the on-line appendix reports the MLE estimates with last 30 rounds of the data
from the experiment with demand uncertainty and the benchmark experiment, respectively.
We use the nonparametric bootstrap method of computing standard errors of the model
parameters with 500 replications.
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For Online Publication: Additional empirical material
In this Appendix we report information about intermediation costs and average prices over
time and across different treatments, both for the benchmark experiment (Table 12 and Table
13) and for the experiment with demand uncertainty (Table 14 and Table 15). We also present
a selective set of plots on distributions of estimated prices and observed prices in the different
treatments (Figures 8 and 9).
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1 ~ 10 11 ~ 20 21 ~ 30 31 ~ 40 41 ~ 50 51 ~ 60
19.76 12.77 7.80 6.04 4.81 5.36
(80) (80) (80) (80) (80) (80)
41.77 24.62 18.44 14.08 11.96 12.01
(52) (49) (50) (44) (44) (50)
39.05 22.92 17.54 14.99 12.92 13.00
(18) (21) (20) (26) (26) (20)
40.40 30.51 22.36 20.35 17.60 20.71
(5) (11) (11) (8) (5) (9)
41.85 29.66 26.44 22.20 20.11 22.09
(17) (14) (15) (13) (14) (14)
41.41 29.31 23.53 22.01 20.07 17.54
(11) (11) (10) (12) (15) (10)
43.32 30.73 24.44 20.76 24.54 18.20
(7) (4) (4) (7) (6) (7)
89.19 98.09 98.06 99.20 99.67 99.31
(15) (22) (17) (15) (15) (16)
87.35 85.00 92.85 97.59 95.00 96.88
(14) (5) (18) (13) (12) (8)
66.09 73.44 74.59 74.28 73.50 66.31
(11) (9) (11) (15) (12) (13)
76.35 71.41 66.43 59.33 58.00 65.17
(7) (9) (7) (6) (4) (6)
86.06 87.51 86.90 85.53 84.94 81.82
(7) (9) (7) (12) (11) (13)
90.19 84.12 76.83 81.00 71.57 82.25
(5) (3) (3) (5) (7) (4)
40.60 47.00 46.50 31.33 32.33 25.56
(5) (5) (4) (3) (6) (8)
(1, 2, 4, 4)
(2, 2, 4, 6)
(2, 2, 5, 5)
(0, 2, 2, 4) or (0, 2, 3,
3)
Note: The number in a cell is the sample average. The number in parentheses is the number of observations. #Cr denotes
the number of critical intermediaries, #Paths denotes the number of paths connecting buyer and seller, d(q) denotes the
length of path q beween buyer and seller.
Ring with
hubs
(1, 1, 2, --)
(2, 1, 3, --)
(1, 2, 3, 5)
Ring 10
(0, 2, 2, 8)
(0, 2, 3, 7)
(0, 2, 4, 6)
(0, 2, 5, 5)
Ring 6
(0, 2, 2, 4)
(0, 2, 3, 3)
Network (#Cr,#Paths, d(q),d(q'))
Rounds
Ring 4 (0, 2, 2, 2)
Table 12: Intermediation costs, conditional on trading, in the benchmark case.
51
1 ~ 10 11 ~ 20 21 ~ 30 31 ~ 40 41 ~ 50 51 ~ 60
23.91 14.98 10.61 8.36 8.84 10.41
(160) (160) (160) (160) (160) (160)
46.41 28.04 20.19 15.79 16.26 14.77
(52) (49) (50) (44) (44) (50)
16.23 9.88 7.49 6.29 5.69 6.53
(156) (147) (150) (132) (132) (150)
22.58 14.04 10.01 8.45 7.84 7.79
(72) (84) (80) (104) (104) (80)
41.40 30.81 24.69 20.93 21.80 30.85
(5) (11) (11) (8) (5) (9)
6.69 6.59 4.45 6.13 3.55 6.74
(35) (77) (77) (56) (35) (63)
24.15 15.89 14.17 12.29 10.60 12.49
(34) (28) (30) (26) (28) (28)
7.73 5.69 5.56 4.60 4.23 5.73
(102) (84) (90) (78) (84) (84)
17.16 10.23 9.00 8.42 7.16 6.56
(33) (33) (30) (36) (45) (30)
9.78 7.61 5.47 4.73 5.19 4.92
(55) (55) (50) (60) (75) (50)
12.65 9.25 7.12 6.08 6.66 5.77
(56) (32) (32) (56) (48) (56)
38.83 44.97 50.18 50.62 53.85 47.85
(12) (11) (11) (15) (13) (13)
36.67 40.36 33.59 32.09 26.31 24.62
(12) (11) (11) (15) (13) (13)
16.26 14.85 9.39 8.97 10.97 8.41
(36) (33) (33) (45) (39) (39)
38.29 36.18 34.86 35.83 35.00 46.17
(8) (9) (7) (6) (4) (6)
28.10 20.28 17.88 14.33 15.31 13.04
(32) (36) (28) (24) (16) (24)
33.14 35.02 34.86 32.47 36.94 33.18
(20) (22) (20) (24) (26) (26)
29.98 27.78 23.07 24.58 20.46 17.46
(10) (11) (10) (12) (13) (13)
12.69 9.59 10.57 8.11 7.82 7.91
(30) (33) (30) (36) (39) (39)
29.50 33.50 23.17 30.67 26.36 30.50
(10) (10) (6) (12) (14) (8)
21.17 16.97 15.71 14.08 12.07 13.00
(20) (20) (12) (24) (28) (16)
45.60 46.79 46.43 48.80 47.50 50.00
(30) (14) (36) (26) (24) (20)
(2, 1, 3, --) Critical
Note: The number in a cell is the sample average. The number in parentheses is the number of observations. #Cr denotes the number of critical
intermediaries, #Paths denotes the number of competing paths connecting buyer and seller, d(q) denotes the length of path q beween buyer and
seller.
Non-critical
(2, 2, 4, 6)
Critical
4 / non-critical
6 / non-critical
(2, 2, 5, 5)
Critical
Non-critical
(5, 5) 5
Ring with
hubs
(1, 2, 3, 5)
Critical
3 / non-critical
5 / non-critical
(1, 2, 4, 4)
Critical
Ring 10
(2, 8)
2
8
(3, 7)
3
7
(4, 6)
4
6
Ring 6
(2, 4)
2
4
(3, 3) 3
Ring 4 (2, 2) 2
Network (#Cr,#Paths,d(q),d(q'))
Distance of own
path / criticality
Rounds
Table 13: Pricing Behavior in the benchmark case.
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1 ~ 10 11 ~ 20 21 ~ 30 31 ~ 40 41 ~ 50 51 ~ 60
18.86 15.74 12.15 10.48 8.93 7.35
(100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100)
34.28 31.01 27.30 27.28 26.88 24.78
(37) (34) (43) (42) (42) (36)
33.64 33.82 36.45 36.02 27.09 26.34
(23) (26) (29) (18) (18) (24)
41.04 25.30 28.19 27.48 31.73 23.31
(22) (17) (22) (12) (19) (16)
34.16 36.26 37.46 33.36 33.08 31.16
(16) (17) (19) (23) (14) (25)
53.50 38.06 39.48 34.62 35.47 33.01
(14) (17) (16) (19) (15) (10)
60.47 49.30 29.69 27.86 41.77 46.12
(8) (9) (3) (6) (12) (9)
43.75 41.75 48.36 41.30 39.95 41.05
(20) (22) (23) (37) (26) (30)
55.76 41.69 44.94 43.78 37.29 45.82
(16) (16) (21) (17) (15) (14)
71.88 67.66 58.02 54.53 59.11 61.00
(28) (30) (30) (20) (33) (30)
61.83 54.30 49.35 58.51 54.18 56.56
(14) (13) (14) (11) (13) (11)
35.44 31.67 31.65 33.29 36.50 31.97
(42) (41) (31) (38) (36) (39)
49.85 46.49 51.08 45.90 50.37 44.23
(30) (28) (31) (27) (27) (26)
69.67 63.67 59.76 64.35 64.92 69.81
(90) (90) (90) (90) (90) (90)
76.94 77.32 69.50 74.04 80.58 79.26
(60) (60) (60) (60) (60) (60)
Line 3
Line 4
(4, 6)
(5, 5)
Line 8 1 6 (7, --)
(3, 5)
(4, 4)
2
(4, 6)
(5, 5)
1
Ring with
Hubs and
Spokes
1
1
Note: The number in a cell is the sample average. The number in parentheses is the number of observations. #Cr
denotes the number of critical intermediaries, #Paths denotes the number of paths connecting buyer and seller, d(q)
denotes the length of path q beween buyer and seller.
Ring 10 2 0
(2, 8)
(3, 7)
(2, --)
2 (3, --)
Line 6 1 4 (5, --)
2
1
Ring 4 2 0 (2, 2)
Ring 6 2 0
(2, 4)
(3, 3)
Network #Paths #Cr (d(q), d(q')) Rounds
Table 14: Intermediation costs, conditional on trading, in the uncertain demand case
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1 ~ 10 11 ~ 20 21 ~ 30 31 ~ 40 41 ~ 50 51 ~ 60
26.66 21.47 16.43 13.46 11.76 10.15
(200) (200) (200) (200) (200) (200)
37.99 32.70 34.38 32.04 28.74 29.93
(37) (34) (43) (42) (42) (36)
19.78 17.97 14.55 15.59 17.21 13.82
(111) (102) (129) (126) (126) (108)
21.31 22.71 21.68 24.05 17.69 21.11
(92) (104) (68) (72) (72) (96)
42.59 26.00 31.32 27.50 33.68 24.66
(22) (17) (22) (12) (19) (16)
15.20 11.05 8.32 12.42 12.67 10.09
(154) (119) (154) (84) (133) (112)
19.06 22.99 20.15 17.51 20.44 18.69
(32) (34) (38) (46) (28) (50)
12.29 7.73 12.05 12.44 11.33 11.63
(96) (102) (114) (138) (84) (150)
21.56 17.33 16.06 13.70 17.26 13.88
(42) (51) (48) (57) (45) (30)
16.51 11.65 12.78 13.68 8.75 8.82
(70) (85) (80) (95) (75) (50)
17.86 14.50 9.07 8.36 12.33 15.05
(64) (72) (24) (48) (96) (72)
23.27 22.47 29.39 22.57 21.02 23.68
(20) (22) (23) (37) (26) (30)
27.03 20.30 22.91 23.66 21.35 21.65
(20) (22) (23) (37) (26) (30)
12.72 11.87 13.39 13.89 14.25 9.38
(60) (66) (69) (111) (78) (90)
26.03 19.03 22.74 20.47 15.73 20.36
(16) (16) (21) (17) (15) (14)
21.72 16.01 17.03 15.57 15.34 16.06
(64) (64) (84) (68) (60) (56)
25.47 25.28 20.58 18.43 20.76 22.19
(56) (60) (60) (40) (66) (60)
25.39 20.33 18.72 19.28 18.99 18.83
(28) (30) (30) (20) (33) (30)
13.99 9.85 14.84 16.52 13.41 11.80
(84) (90) (90) (60) (99) (90)
19.09 16.92 15.43 16.64 16.72 16.81
(28) (26) (28) (22) (26) (22)
17.88 14.68 14.02 19.98 15.94 16.71
(56) (52) (56) (44) (52) (44)
35.44 31.67 31.65 33.29 36.50 31.97
(42) (41) (31) (38) (36) (39)
24.92 23.25 25.54 22.95 25.19 22.11
(60) (56) (62) (54) (54) (52)
17.42 15.92 14.94 16.09 16.23 17.45
(360) (360) (360) (360) (360) (360)
12.82 12.89 11.58 12.34 13.43 13.21
(360) (360) (360) (360) (360) (360)
Ring with
Hubs and
Spokes
Line 3
Line 4 Critical
(6, 1, 7, --) Critical
Note: The number in a cell is the sample average. The number in parentheses is the number of observations. #Cr denotes the number of critical
intermediaries, #Paths denotes the number of competing paths connecting buyer and seller, d(q) denotes the length of path q beween buyer and
seller.
(4, 1, 5, --) CriticalLine 6
Line 8
(2, 1, 2, --) Critical
(2, 2, 4, 6)
Critical
4 / non-critical
6 / non-critical
(2, 2, 5, 5)
Critical
3 / non-critical
5 / non-critical
(1, 2, 4, 4)
Critical
Non-critical
(2, 1, 3, --)
Ring 10
(2, 8)
2
8
(3, 7)
3
7
(4, 6)
4
6
Critical
Non-critical
(5, 5) 5
(1, 2, 3, 5)
Ring 6
(2, 4)
2
4
(3, 3) 3
Ring 4 (2, 2) 2
Network (#Cr,#Paths,d(q),d(q'))
Distance of own
path / criticality
Rounds
Table 15: Pricing behavior in the uncertain demand case
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Figure 8: Comparison: predicted vs observed prices in benchmark model
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Figure 9: Comparison: predicted vs observed prices with uncertain demand
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